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Africa and Europe Combatting Climate Change

Towards a Common Agenda in 2015

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Key messages

The 2015 UN Climate Change Conference is fast approaching. Despite promising progress in recent years, the negotiations of a new agreement to keep the dangers of climate change at bay still face many technical and political hurdles and are plagued with divisions among countries.

Europe has remained at the forefront of the negotiations and contributed to their progress. But a changing global context and the EU's own limitations have diminished its leadership. The Africa Group, with its sheer size and improving coordination has become an increasingly influent actor in the negotiations.

Climate change is a priority area of the Africa-EU relations. Despite a mixed record, the dialogue framed by the Joint Africa-EU Strategy (JAES) has illustrated how an interregional partnership could contribute to the multilateral climate regime through cooperation at a more practical level.

Based on their respective and shared experiences, beyond the JAES, Africa and Europe could offer solutions and compromises that break some of the deadlocks in the UN negotiations. This could level the playing field for all actors and promote coherence, effectiveness and equity in global development and climate policies.

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The views expressed here remain those of the authors and should not be attributed to any other person or institution.

Acronyms

ACP	African, Caribbean and Pacific
ACPC	African Climate Policy Centre
ADP	Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action
AF	Adaptation Fund
AfDB	African Development Bank
AGN	Africa Group of Negotiators
AU	African Union
AUC	African Union Commission
AMCEN	African Ministerial Conference on Environment
BASIC	Brazil, South Africa, India, China
CAHOSCC	Conference of African Heads of State and Government on Climate Change
CAN	Climate Action Framework
CBDR-RC	Common But Differentiated Responsibilities and Respective Capabilities
CCDA	Conference on Climate Change and Development in Africa
CDM	Clean Development Mechanism
ClimDev-Africa	Climate for Development in Africa
COP	Conference of the Parties
COREPER	Committee of Permanent Representatives
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
DG CLIMA	Directorate-General for Climate Action
DG DEVCO	Directorate-General for Development and Cooperation
EC	European Commission
EDF	European Development Fund
EEAS	European External Action Service
ETS	Emissions Trading System
EU	European Union
G77	The Group of 77
GCCA	Global Climate Change Alliance

GCF	Green Climate Fund
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GEF	Global Environment Facility
GGWSSI	Great Green Wall for the Sahara and the Sahel Initiative
GHG	greenhouse gas
HSG	Heads of State and Government
IJEGs	Informal Joint Expert Groups
INDCs	Intended Nationally Determined Contributions
IPCC	Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
JAES	Joint Africa-EU Strategy
JEG	Joint Expert Group
JTF	Joint Task Force
KP	Kyoto Protocol
LDCs	Least Developing Countries
LMDCs	Like-Minded Developing Countries
MRV	Measurement, Reporting and Verification
NAMA	Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions
NAP	National Adaptation Plan
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NEPAD	New Partnership for Africa's Development
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
PanAf	Pan-African Programme
PCC	Partnership on Climate Change
PCCE	Partnership on Climate Change and the Environment
PIDA	Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa
REC	Regional Economic Community
RECP	Renewable Energy Cooperation Programme
REDD+	Reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNECA	United Nations Economic Commission for Africa
UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme
UNFCCC	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change

Executive summary

The United Nations Climate Change Conference in Paris (COP21) in December 2015 is fast approaching. Success at COP21 is critical to the post-2015 global climate regime that could keep climate change under control. If a new climate agreement is not reached, the world's sustainable development path will be jeopardized. However, many issues remain unresolved. Stakeholders should exploit every opportunity available to advance the dialogue and cooperation around those issues and find solutions before COP21.

When African and EU leaders gathered at the 4th EU-Africa Summit in 2014 to discuss several common challenges, including climate change, the European Union (EU) and the African Union (AU) reiterated their shared concerns in relation to climate change. They expressed their willingness to fight it together and ensure that an effective agreement would be reached in 2015. Yet, not much action has taken place since that Summit.

The question remains whether Africa-EU relations add value to international climate policy processes and improve the odds of concluding an ambitious and fair agreement in Paris. This Discussion Paper addresses this key question. The objective however is not to determine a common position between the Africa Group and the EU for COP21, but find areas and ways in which they could collaboratively contribute to such an agreement and to the effective implementation of their respective commitments in the post-2015 period. This paper is meant to inform climate as well as development policymakers with a particular interest in African and European policy processes in the run-up to COP21.[1]

This Discussion Paper is structured around three main questions: 1) How have Africa and the EU participated and interacted in the international climate negotiations and what have been their positions? 2) Has the Joint Africa-EU Strategy (JAES) enabled them to formulate common responses to climate change? 3) What challenges could they jointly tackle to promote an ambitious and fair international climate regime and implement actions to adapt to climate change and mitigate it?

The EU has been a leader in international climate policy since the beginning of the multilateral negotiations. Its historical greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions compel it to substantially reduce them now. The EU bloc has considerably cut its emissions over the past decade and EU institutions and member states have expended sizeable resources to support adaptation and mitigation outside Europe.

Yet, a few years ago, the EU's normative approach in the negotiations of a post-Kyoto-Protocol regime (in particular, its inflexible position in favour of legally binding GHG emissions reduction commitments) failed to convince emerging economies, developing countries, and even developed countries like the US, which had opted out of the Kyoto Protocol. Internally, disputes among EU member states with different energy policies and concerns about industrial competitiveness have weakened its determination. In an increasingly multipolar world and with the rise of emerging economies, the EU's clout in the negotiations is becoming more limited. Now, with its good track record and recent changes undertaken, it is willing to adopt a more flexible approach to emissions cut commitments. The EU can thus still play a major role in the upcoming climate talks.

African Parties, which constitute a large group, used to play a marginal role in the climate negotiations as members of the "Global South". But they have become much better organized since the ratification of the

[1] This is the first paper in a series of three that will look at climate change issues concerning Africa and Europe, including climate finance and the implications of climate change for agricultural development and food security. For more information, go to www.ecdpm.org

Kyoto Protocol in 2005 and have increasingly spoken with one voice, thereby gaining influence. Their general position is clear: although they are willing to contribute to mitigation efforts, they demand that a large portion of climate finance be used to support adaptation. Furthermore, as economic growth and poverty reduction remain their priorities in the medium term, they also expect support—in the form of climate finance, capacity building and technology transfer—for their mitigation measures.

Africa and the EU have interacted in relation to climate policy in several ways. Since the 2011 Durban climate change conference, the EU and Africa have exhibited a rapprochement, perhaps realising that they had more to gain from a joint approach than replicating the antagonistic positions taken in Copenhagen two years earlier. In the preparation of multilateral negotiations, EU and African institutions have met at the ministerial level to share their positions and address their divergences. Ahead of the Warsaw COP, in 2013, and the Lima COP, in 2014, inter-ministerial meetings have taken place. The EU's climate diplomacy, which has become better organised over time, has facilitated such interactions. Furthermore, development cooperation frameworks between EU and African actors have supported policy dialogues and the implementation of adaptation and mitigation measures in Africa.

The Joint Africa-EU Strategy (JAES), a partnership signed in 2007 that was intended to be more political and strategic than preceding frameworks for Africa-EU relations, made climate change a priority area of cooperation. Initially, this partnership raised high expectations about the prospects of a common approach to climate policy at different levels. Overall, this partnership has probably helped to build a common understanding between African and EU actors of various climate-related issues and of their respective positions in the UNFCCC negotiations. It may also have improved the coherence among some of their climate-related actions. For example, ClimDev-Africa, a JAES-sponsored programme providing climatic information and analytical support, has informed processes guided by the JAES such as the Great Green Wall for the Sahara and the Sahel Initiative (GGWSSI), an initiative for adaptation.

However, the general perception is that the JAES' climate change partnership mainly served as a forum where talks were not followed by appropriate actions and concrete outcomes. Many problems have afflicted the JAES and the climate change partnership in particular: a cumbersome institutional structure and inefficient policy processes that discouraged stakeholders; weak linkages between the consultative, technical structure and both decision-making and implementing bodies; the ambiguous mandate of the consultative structure with respect to the initiatives supposedly overseen by the JAES; and above all a deficit of political support on both sides. A major objective of this partnership was to cooperate in the multilateral negotiations. However, no significant results were achieved as a lack of clarity on the common interests of African and EU actors, diverging views and internal divisions rendered their dialogue ineffective.

Despite the meagre record of the JAES, all things considered, the gap between Africa's and the EU's stances on climate change has somewhat narrowed (see Table 1 below for an overview of their positions). The EU has come to better recognise adaptation needs in Africa and it has been increasingly supportive of making adaptation a central element of the future climate agreement, a point that the Africa Group has vehemently upheld for a long time. In recent years African Parties have shown willingness to contribute to mitigation efforts within their capabilities. Both the EU and Africa Group have expressed their determination to adopt a legally binding climate agreement in 2015 and highlighted the urgent need to fund Africa's adaptation gap, for instance at the 2014 EU-Africa Summit.

However, some **disagreements persist**. The Africa Group and the EU disagree on climate finance matters. For example, the EU refused to present a roadmap for climate finance for the pre-2020 period, as requested by African Parties. African leaders ask that commitments under the new climate agreement include support for adaptation in vulnerable countries, which should be on voluntary basis only according to the EU. Within the Africa Group, some countries like South Africa oppose legally binding emissions reduction targets for emerging and developing countries.

The respective and common interests of African and EU actors should be properly thought out if they are to pursue a meaningful continent-to-continent partnership addressing climate issues. This partnership should address those issues at appropriate governance levels, where interests intersect and with the involvement of the right institutions and non-state actors. The complexity of climate policymaking and its interdependencies with other sectors, notably economic development, requires sophisticated knowledge, coordination among domestic actors and development partners, and coherence among policies in different sectors and places. Proposing innovative ways to address outstanding issues in the provisional text of the agreement, sharing experiences and expertise in climate policymaking, improving the transparency and effectiveness of climate finance, ensuring that climate policy frameworks are coherent with other (continental and regional) policy frameworks: such approaches could lead to opportunities to contribute to the global climate regime.

More specifically, in relation to COP21, African and EU stakeholders could foster further reflection on the “equity principle” and approaches to put it into practice. They could deepen the dialogue on the differentiation of contributions to mitigation efforts and support a timely process of submission and *ex ante* review of countries’ proposed contributions on the basis of effectiveness and fairness in limiting the global temperature increase to two degree Celsius. In addition, they could continue to advocate for adaptation and further stimulate a dialogue on adaptation finance effectiveness on the basis of their long-time joint experience in development and adaptation in vulnerable areas (including under the JAES). Lastly, they can work together to improve reporting on climate-related development assistance and other sources of climate finance, which would contribute to the climate finance effectiveness debate and the continuing process of assessing the adaptation gap.

If the Africa-EU political dialogue and cooperation on climate policy can add value to other cooperation frameworks between African and Europe or multilateral processes, then they should be more efficient than in the past, whether under the JAES priority area ‘Global and Emerging Issues’ or other frameworks such as the dialogue between the European Commission (EC) and the African Ministerial Conference on the Environment (AMCEN) and dialogues between EU Delegations and national governments or regional institutions, which have proved constructive in some instances. In those frameworks, the weak linkages between African and European decision-making structures, technical consultations and UNFCCC processes should be redressed. In the case of the JAES in particular, more concrete goals for Africa-EU cooperation should set clearer roles and responsibilities of technical bodies and make the dialogue result-oriented.

Obtaining political support is not a requirement only for the JAES or other Africa-EU frameworks; it is needed for a joint and coherent response to climate change in Africa and in Europe. In particular, it will help address the adaptation and development needs of vulnerable economic sectors and populations on the African continent. For that purpose, **it is needed an inclusive, sustained and substantial dialogue providing a just appreciation of the problems and evaluating adequate responses**. Involving better in the dialogue non-institutional actors who will be exposed to climate change and meet the costs or receive the benefits of climate policies could enhance the quality of this dialogue and facilitate concrete actions.

Table 1: Key positions of the Africa Group and the EU regarding the 2015 agreement

	Africa Group	EU
Principles of the new climate agreement—CBDR and equity	The new climate agreement remains based on the CBDR (Common But Differentiated Responsibilities) and a differentiation between developed and developing countries with respect to both mitigation and climate finance commitments. The Africa Group put forward a “principle-based reference framework”, based on indicators of equity and fairness, on the basis of a global carbon budget.	The EU promotes a dynamic interpretation of the CBDR principle: mitigation commitments and the differentiation among countries can evolve over time. The new climate agreement should rely on a common GHG emissions accounting system for all countries, with some flexibility to accommodate different national circumstances and capabilities (South Africa holds a similar view).
Mitigation	Mitigation commitments (Intended Nationally Determined Contributions, INDCs) should be assessed on the basis of a set of criteria including ambition (or effectiveness), equity and fairness. South Africa is in favour of voluntary emissions reduction pledges for developing countries.	Mitigation commitments (INDCs) should be legally binding for all Parties to the climate negotiations, except for the least developed countries who make emissions reduction pledges on a voluntary basis. The EU is in favour of emissions accounting rules, a monitoring, reporting and verification system, and a compliance system.
Adaptation	A global estimation of adaptation costs sets a benchmark for developed countries’ commitments to supporting adaptation. Adaptation plans for developing countries (endorsed by both developing and developed countries) are part of the commitments (INDCs) made under the new climate regime.	Adaptation should be a central element of the new climate agreement but the inclusion of adaptation measures in the INDCs is voluntary. The agreement should ensure that adaptation measures are effective.
Climate finance	Climate finance commitments towards least developed countries should be part of countries’ INDCs under the new climate regime. The Green Climate Fund equally allocates climate finance between adaptation and mitigation purposes. Mechanisms to facilitate technology transfer and their financing modalities are specified under the agreement.	Climate finance should be scaled up (towards the goal of providing US$100 billion of climate finance by 2020) and the transparency of contributions should be improved but the EU opposes the quantification of long-term climate finance commitments. The climate agreement should provide a framework for shifting both public and private investments towards low-carbon economic activities.

1. Europe and Africa at a crossroads of climate policy

The negotiations of a new international agreement on climate change in 2015 are at the top of the international community's agenda. Will it succeed in putting in place an effective regime to fight climate change? This question will most likely remain uncertain until late in the United Nations (UN) Climate Change Conference in Paris in December 2015, when signatory countries to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) will seek to agree on new national commitments for greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions reduction and other measures to avert the harmful economic, social and environmental effects of climate change. At the 20th Conference of the Parties (COP20) to the UNFCCC in Lima in December 2014, progress was made towards the acceptance of the principle that all countries should make commitments to mitigate and adapt to climate change.[2] However, **climate negotiators left Lima with many important unresolved issues**. Not least, they were unable to set the seal on the legal nature of the future agreement. The remaining road to Paris promises to be arduous as thorny technical issues as well as political disagreements between parties are yet to be resolved, with a little more than six month left.

Climate change was among the main challenges discussed at the 4th EU-Africa Summit that took place in Brussels a year ago. **In the April 2014 Summit's declaration, the European Union (EU) and the African Union (AU) reiterated their willingness to work together to fight climate change and to ensure that an effective agreement be reached in 2015.** The Roadmap for 2014-17, accompanying that declaration included climate change on the priority list of joint actions between Africa and the EU.[3] Many of the actions related to climate change were elaborated in the continuity of the long-time cooperation between African and European actors in this thematic area. On the basis of this experience, well-established political, economic and cooperation relations and this roadmap for AU-EU cooperation, **how can the Africa and EU groups together contribute to forging an effective post-Kyoto Protocol international climate regime?** This is the central question addressed by this Discussion Paper, which aims to inform and better frame the dialogue on climate change between African and European stakeholders.

Global emissions of heat-trapping gases have kept increasing at a fast pace. The latest series of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) assessment reports warned that climate change is happening faster than expected and that its expected impacts are worsening as emissions continue to grow. **An extrapolation of current emission trends entails a rise in the global average temperature greater than two degree Celsius** (IPCC, 2014). At the same time **efforts to reduce emissions remain insufficient** (UNEP, 2013b) while **current actions and plans for adaptation do not measure up to those risks**. Yet, the Stern Review explains that the long run costs and the economic risks of inaction outweigh the costs of taking adaptation and mitigation measures (Stern, 2007).

For Europe the stakes in the international climate policy process are high. The European continent is exposed to climate change and potential economic, social and environmental losses are significant even if

[2] Tackling climate change is done through mitigation as well as adaptation measures. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) defines "mitigation" as *'an anthropogenic intervention to reduce the anthropogenic forcing of the climate system; it includes strategies to reduce greenhouse gas sources and emissions and enhancing greenhouse gas sinks'*. "Adaptation" is defined as *'adjustment in natural or human systems in response to actual or expected climatic stimuli or their effects, which moderates harm or exploits beneficial opportunities'* (see: http://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/ar4/wg2/en/annexessglossary-a-d.html).

[3] A high-level seminar was held in the margins of the 4th EU-Africa Summit in Brussels in 2014, under the aegis of the then EU Commissioner for Climate Action, Connie Hedegaard, the President of the African Ministerial Conference on the Environment (AMCEN), Binilith Mahenge, and the African Union Commissioner for Rural Economy and Agriculture, Rhoda Tumusiime. Following this seminar European and African ministers issued a joint statement reiterating their commitment to closely cooperating on climate change (see http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_STATEMENT-14-97_en.htm).

its economies and societies' coping capacities may be greater than in developing countries. The destabilizing effects of climate change on ecosystems and socio-economic structures worldwide constitute a serious threat to Europe, which could manifest itself as reduced commercial opportunities, more frequent humanitarian crises requiring its assistance, increased migratory movements from surrounding vulnerable regions, and greater social instability and conflict risk putting its international political and economic interests. The EU and several of its member states have invested much political capital in the negotiations. They have embarked on a shift to reduce their GHG emissions in various sectors, especially in the energy sector, taking into account the GHG emissions targets they would have under an ambitious international climate regime, that is, an enforceable international agreement on GHG emissions targets. The EU has played a leading role in the international climate policy process and has made consequential commitments.

In these negotiations the stakes are high for Africa too.[4] The continent is particularly exposed and vulnerable to adverse shifts in climatic patterns, with a dry climate in many areas and populations highly dependent on agriculture and ecosystems. Africa is likely to experience faster warming than the rest of the globe during this century, although the future effects of climate change in any given region are highly uncertain and there might be significant variations across regions of the continent—notably for agro-climatic conditions, which could deteriorate in some regions but improve in others (IPCC, 2007). Some effects may already be felt in some countries (reduced and irregular rainfall, soil degradation and degradation of other environmental assets). The risks and the vulnerabilities of populations vary across regions, their level of socio-economic development and institutions being key determinants of their capacities to adapt. Considering the generally high levels of vulnerability of many African countries, notably with regards to **agriculture, food security, water security and social cohesion**, Africa has a major interest in an international regime that curbs GHG emissions.

African countries have a big stake in resources transfers from big historical emitters to finance and implement adaptation and mitigation activities, not just because their historical contributions to GHG emissions are small (less than 4% of global GHG emissions come from the African continent (Nakhooda *et al.*, 2011)), but also because Africa can contribute to climate change mitigation through carbon retention and green growth. With its tropical forests, particularly in the Congo basin, and vast arable land areas this continent can store large amounts of carbon. Given the expected rapid growth in energy consumption needs in Africa in the coming decades, the early adoption of low-carbon energies and green growth paths would make an important contribution to mitigation. So far, only a small part of financial and technological transfers from developed countries to developing countries to finance GHG emissions reductions has gone to Africa[5] (Severino, 2009) and most countries of Sub-Saharan Africa have received only tiny fractions of financial assistance for mitigation and the acquisition of low-carbon technologies—the bulk of mitigation finance has been directed to Morocco, South Africa[6] and, to a lesser extent, Kenya and Nigeria, leaving many Sub-Saharan countries with little access to climate finance (Barnard *et al.*, 2014)).[7] On the other hand, economic transformation, poverty reduction and human development are the main priorities in African developing countries. Investing more in productive sectors, health, education, science and technology in the short term could go a long way in reaching a low-carbon, inclusive development path in the medium term, once a certain level of well-being and capabilities is attained and environmental legislation can be tightened.

[4] At the 2013 Conference on Climate Change and Development in Africa, the Executive Secretary of the UN Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), Carlos Lopes, stated that Africa had to *'firm up its own views on how to put the continent's interest first [in the international climate negotiations]'*.

[5] In the case of the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), *'less than 2 per cent of the projects take place in Africa, compared to 73 per cent for Asia'* (http://climateandcapitalism.com/2011/03/31/the-cdm-and-africa-marketing-a-new-land-grab/).

[6] This statement is based on research from Climate Funds Update. They describe "mitigation funding" as all the funding for mitigation coming from a long list of funding mechanisms, ranging from Clean Technology Fund to Norway's International Climate and Forest Initiative. For more details, see: http://www.climatefundsupdate.org/the-funds.

[7] See also: http://www.climatefundsupdate.org/themes/mitigation.

Aside from technical solutions, **reaching an effective international agreement requires trade-offs between competing policy objectives**. In formulating climate policies, countries face trade-offs between short-term economic objectives and long-term social and environmental sustainability goals. Developing countries in particular face such trade-offs, although in their case economic development and poverty reduction remain paramount objectives. The international community faces trade-offs between investing in mitigation and adaptation. On the basis of historical responsibilities for GHG emissions and current capabilities, countries have to determine their respective contributions to climate change mitigation, the amount of resources transferred from developed to developing countries, and the role that emerging economies should play in reducing GHG emissions and assisting poorer countries. In other words, international climate policy hinges on trade-offs and has distributional consequences that have to be negotiated.

Rapidly evolving geopolitical and economic circumstances pose challenges to the negotiating parties. **The steady rebalancing of economic activity from the West to Asia and the financial and economic crises that have affected the United States (US) and EU economies have altered the landscape of the international climate negotiations and somewhat diminished the capabilities of many developed countries to lead a global green growth policy agenda.** In these circumstances, to make ambitious commitments to reduce GHG emissions, Parties have to be confident that other nations will act upon their commitments and assume their fair shares of the burden. Strong, consensus-based institutions are needed to establish mutual confidence.

To better understand the concerns of one another, share perceptions of their capacities to mitigate and adapt to climate change and of what constitutes appropriate trade-offs, and determine appropriate interventions, **a broader and deeper dialogue on climate change between the EU and Africa would be useful**. The need for and the usefulness of such dialogue are manifest in such event as the recent Élysée Summit for Peace and Security in Africa, which took place in Paris in December 2013, where African and French Heads of State and Government (HSG) discussed climate change issues and related challenges in the areas of agriculture and energy.[8] Between the time of writing and the Paris conference, African and European stakeholders will have more opportunities to converge towards a common understanding of the future climate regime, address misunderstandings and sketch out compromises that could ease the work of negotiators at COP21 and in follow-up negotiations.

This paper will start by reviewing **how Africans and Europeans have positioned themselves in the international climate negotiations so far**. The UNFCCC is the most important forum where Africans and Europeans, together with many other stakeholders, have had a dialogue on climate change. We will examine their views, approaches and commitments over the past few years. We will also provide an update on the UNFCCC negotiations and highlight recent shifts in their landscape. We will then focus on the climate change partnership under the **Joint Africa-EU Strategy** (JAES) on the basis of which African and European stakeholders have carried out a political dialogue and cooperation bilaterally. Thirdly, we will outline **key issues that Africans and Europeans could further discuss in the coming months to promote an effective international agreement in 2015 and beyond**. This paper draws on various sources, including academic papers, policy analyses and institutional documents. It is also based on interviews with African and European public officials and various observers of international climate policy.

[8] The Élysée Summit for Peace and Security in Africa took place in Paris on December 6 and 7, 2013. African and French HSG discussed climate change issues, along with peace, security, economic and development issues. They repeated that it is crucial to limit the rise in the average temperature to less than 2°C and their willingness to reach an agreement at the COP21. France offered to provide support to African countries in preparing their propositions to contribute to the objective of the UNFCCC and the COP21 agreement. African leaders reiterated their call for financial resources, technology transfers and support for capacity building, especially to make agriculture resilient to climate change and adopt a low-carbon development path, as per existing UNFCCC commitments.

2. European and African dynamics in the UNFCCC

2.1. From Kyoto to Lima: An overview

The UNFCCC is the main institutional framework for international climate policymaking. This treaty, established at the 1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development (held in Rio de Janeiro), with currently 195 signatory countries (the "Parties"), aimed to stabilise atmospheric concentrations of GHG emissions below levels that would dangerously disrupt the earth's climate (UNFCCC, 1992). To address this collective action problem through international cooperation, the UNFCCC provides an **overarching framework for negotiating and ratifying international agreements limiting GHG emissions and supporting other interventions addressing the causes and effects of climate change**. The COP, which convenes all of the Parties, constitutes the decision-making body of the UNFCCC. Annex 1 gives an overview of the milestone agreements of the UNFCCC since the Kyoto Protocol (1997).

In 1997, the **Kyoto Protocol** (KP) was launched as the outcome of the UNFCCC negotiations. This agreement legally committed - under international law - 37 industrialised countries and the European Union 15 (made up of 15 EU member states at the time of the Kyoto negotiations) to binding GHG emissions targets. Under the KP, developed countries assumed, based on their historical GHG emissions, almost all of the mitigation efforts to reduce GHG emissions. It was the responsibility of the "Global South" to develop in a sustainable manner and adapt to climatic changes, entirely based on the principle of "equity".[9] This **North-South differentiation was legally laid down in the UNFCCC's fundamental principle of Common But Differentiated Responsibilities** (CBDR)[10]. However, this stark divide no longer reflects the socio-economic growth that some countries have reached over the past three decades: the emissions of developing countries increased by more than 200% between 1990 and 2008, while the already high emissions of industrialised countries have generally remained the same (Pauw *et al.*, 2014). The general consensus at recent COPs is that CBDR should be reinvigorated. At the Lima COP (December 2014), the diplomatic phrase of *'in light of different national circumstances'* was added to the CBDR principle to appease both developed and developing countries. That means that countries that have the capacity are now required to curb their carbon emissions, through Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs) that should all be on the table by the end of 2015.[11]

However, moving towards a global and more inclusive agenda has been a continuously critical roadblock. After the 2008 – 2012 commitment period, a new agreement was supposed to take over the KP. **At the Copenhagen COP in 2009, Parties failed to reach an agreement on the post-2012 regime** in which all (developed, as well as emerging and developing) countries would commit to GHG emissions reductions. With developing countries unwilling to enter legally binding emissions abatement commitments under the KP regime, and the assistance for mitigation as well as adaptation pledged by developed countries falling short of the former's expectations, an agreement could not be reached (UNFCCC, 2007). The Doha Agreement to the KP (2012), extending the KP for the period 2013-2020, was supposed to bring salvation, but only a few Parties ratified it. The Warsaw COP (2013) was again evidence of the difficulty of merging all

[9] The UNFCCC classified countries into two groups: Annex-I and non-Annex I countries. The former include all the OECD countries and economies in transition. They committed themselves specifically to the aim of returning individually or jointly to their 1990 levels of GHG emissions by the year 2000. The latter have ratified or acceded to the UNFCCC (http://unfccc.int/parties_and_observers/items/2704.php).

[10] "Common but differentiated responsibilities" is the general principle that is usually referred to under the UNFCCC; it represents how the notion was first mentioned as a principle at the 1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development (the so-called "Rio Conference"). Within the UNFCCC, CBDR was then stretched to include "respective capabilities" (hence, CBDR-RC). However, the latter were not included as a legal principle. Therefore, in this note, we use the term "CBDR" (Pauw, *et al.*, 2014).

[11] The INDCs are the post 2020 climate actions that countries intend to take up under the new international agreement in Paris 2015 (http://www.wri.org/indc-definition).

Parties' positions: emerging economies, most notably the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa), remained reluctant to the notion of "commitment" to legally binding GHG emissions reduction targets (a notion that the EU is defending). At the Lima COP20, a compromising policy framework to reach the 2 degrees Celsius target was eventually agreed upon.

As mentioned, **developed countries' financial as well as technical assistance has fallen short by developing countries' expectations**. Although developing countries urgently need to adapt to the adverse impacts of climate change, funding has been more strongly dedicated to mitigation activities.[12] In Cancun (2010), the COP began to mend the discord between developed and developing countries with developed countries making new pledges for climate finance. The previous COP (Copenhagen, 2010) has already set the right path: developed countries had agreed to *'provide new and additional resources […] approaching US$30 billion for the period 2010–2012, with balanced allocation between adaptation and mitigation'* (Schalatek, *et al*, 2010). The Cancun Agreements further elevated adaptation in vulnerable countries to the same priority level as mitigation. In Lima (2014), the Green Climate Fund (GCF), presented in Copenhagen (2009) and launched in Cancun (2010), passed its first capitalization target of US$10 billion. The target of the GCF is to mobilise US$ 100 billion by 2020. The funding aims at balancing 50/50 between mitigation and adaptation.[13]

Altogether, compromises and stronger commitments by all Parties have led to incremental progress since the failure of the Copenhagen COP. However, the **Lima COP showed that finding a global agreement remains an incredible challenge: several critical issues have been postponed**. The Parties could not agree on whether the future agreement will be legally binding. If so, will the targets be binding at domestic levels or will they be enforced at the international level? Moreover, a compliance system could not be established so that countries do not have the power to influence other countries' commitments. Adaptation still does not seem to draw the same level of political attention as mitigation. Other pressing issues that could not be resolved were: the US$10 billion mark for the GCF was reached, but ambiguity over how to achieve the ultimate US$100 billion goal remains. How will climate finance be used (for example, through infrastructure projects, urban planning, mainstreaming)? How will the agreement bring international transparency in the areas of energy and climate action, including with regards the comparability of carbon prices? There is also no final answer to how coalitions for collective action will be built (for example, involvement of the private sector, non-state actors)? (UNFCCC, 2014a).[14] Finally, will the 2015 agreement be capable of evolving without having to be re-negotiated every year?

2.2. EU's ambitions and limitations in the climate negotiations

2.2.1. The EU within the UNFCCC: the challenge of speaking with one voice

The EU has spearheaded international climate policy processes since the inception of the UNFCCC. It played a leading role in the negotiations of the KP and it was a strong supporter of the inclusion of the CBDR principle in the KP. Through those actions, the EU gained the reputation of a leader in international environmental policy (Vogler, 2005; Zito, 2005). Climate policy has been a strategic domain of the EU's external action (Herrero and Knaepen, 2014). The EU has often led its member states (as well as other Parties) to the Convention in the negotiating processes. Legally, the EU applies a "shared system" of

[12] http://www.climatefundsupdate.org/the-funds.
[13] http://www.climatefundsupdate.org/listing/green-climate-fund.
[14] Parties adopted the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage that will assist vulnerable developing countries affected by natural disasters and other adverse circumstances linked to climate change effects that are difficult or impossible to adapt to. The instruments that will serve to fulfil the Parties' commitments are still not well defined (http://unfccc.int/key_steps/warsaw_outcomes/items/8006.php).

representation in the UNFCCC negotiations, as laid down in Article 4 (2e) of the Treaty of the European Union. This means that EU member states can still legislate as long as there is no EU judicial act on the issue. The EU always stressed the importance of internal cohesion, although this has often proved to be challenging. Even EU institutions themselves acknowledge that (European Court of Auditors, 2013).

At the **Copenhagen COP in 2009, the EU suffered a significant setback**. Herrero and Knaepen (2014) explain that *'in an increasingly multipolar environment where national interests prevail, the EU's tactics proved to be too normative, rigid and euro-centric'* (Herrero and Knaepen, 2014: page 3). EU's internal cohesion declined: EU member states pursued their own bilateral interests. Reasons included the preoccupation with the European financial crisis and the growing assertiveness of coal-reliant European states, opposing EU's climate and energy policies (Pavese and Torney, 2012).

The **EU's Lisbon Treaty, agreed in 2009, gave the EU the chance to "rebuild" its external climate architecture**. The purpose of the Treaty was *'to make the EU […] better able to address global problems, such as climate change, with one voice.'*[15] In 2010, a specialised Directorate-General for Climate Action (DG CLIMA) was established within the European Commission and one year later, the European External Action Service (EEAS) was set up. In 2012, EEAS took over the leadership of EU's Green Diplomacy Network that set the EU's climate diplomacy on the path to becoming more joined-up and influential (Herrero and Knaepen, 2014). The EU's Climate Commissioner (currently Miguel Arias Cañete) now represents the EU in the UNFCCC meetings. Representatives from DG International Cooperation and Development (DEVCO) and EEAS also take part, in addition to negotiators from DG CLIMA. Prior to the UN international negotiations, the EU will form a common position following a number of steps, as described in Figure 1.

Figure 1: Steps to articulate a common EU position in UNFCCC negotiations[16]



Source: adapted from Pavese and Torney, 2012[17]

The **EU has a mixed approach to negotiations, setting up alliances with different groups and/or parties (bilateral or multilateral) depending on the circumstances** (Pavese and Torney, 2012). Since the Copenhagen COP, the EU and a number of member states took part in the Cartagena Group/Dialogue for Progressive Action, which gathers 30 progressive states from the North and the South, that seek to push for global climate action. During the Durban COP in 2011, the EU took up its leadership role and fostered cooperation among Parties: in partnership with the Chair of the African Group of Negotiators (AGN), which supported the EU's position, the EU made the case for a new agreement that would be legally binding and involve all countries. Together, the Africa Group and the EU assembled a coalition with other Parties that pushed unwilling G20 members into validating that approach (Gavas, 2013). The EU succeeded in playing a strong role in shaping the outcome of the Durban COP (Pavese and Torney, 2012).

15 http://europa.eu/about-eu/basic-information/decision-making/treaties/index_en.htm.
16 The COREPER is the Permanent Representatives Committee of EU member states. It prepares the work of the Council of the EU, which takes place at Ministerial level. It consists of representatives from the member states with the rank of member states' ambassadors to the EU and is chaired by the member state that holds the Council Presidency (Herrero and Knaepen, 2014).

In 2013, in the run-up to and during the Warsaw COP, the EU held talks with many Parties to try to reach consensus on the terms of a new international agreement and implementation modalities. Then, in Warsaw, in 2013, the EU put forward a "stepwise process" towards mitigation commitments that was *'the most ambitious and specific among Parties for both the pre- and post-2020 periods'* (Oberthür and Groen, 2014).[18] However, although a group of countries including Brazil, China and India, initially opposed the EU's proposal, eventually all Parties agreed on a timeline for GHG emissions reductions commitments (Oberthür and Groen, 2014).[19]

Outside of the UN climate talks, the **EU also props up its diplomatic activity to forge a broad international alliance**, supporting the political dialogue on climate change in international forums and thereby creating political momentum towards COP21. For example, during the G20 Summit, held in Brisbane, Australia in November 2014, the EU together with the US and other nations ensured an important passage on climate change in the G20 communiqué, against the will of Australia. This passage expressed support for strong action and *'mobilising finance for adaptation and mitigation, such as the Green Climate Fund'* – to which the US has pledged US$3 billion and Japan US$1.5 billion.[20]

Finally, ahead of Paris, the EU plans to ramp up climate diplomacy through G7/8, G20 and UN General Assembly. To achieve this, the EU Foreign Ministers have endorsed a Climate Diplomacy Action Plan that was jointly developed by DG CLIMA and EEAS.[21] This action plan also proposes to support climate-resilient development through the EU's development cooperation policy and to link climate challenge to security challenges (Council of the European Union, 2015).

2.2.2. Current negotiating positions of the EU

The EU wants the Paris Agreement to be **ambitious, legally binding and applicable to all Parties, meaning that Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs) are applicable to all countries** as stated in its Council Conclusion for the preparation for the Lima COP20 (Council of the European Union, 2014). In this regard, the EU supports the application of the principle of **CBDR in a 'dynamic way'** that is operational at the level of individual mitigation commitments: Parties with most responsibilities and capabilities should carry out absolute emission reduction actions, while other countries with limited responsibilities and capabilities should provide other types of commitments.[22] In a report by the European Parliament on the Development of Climate Negotiations in View of Lima, it is stated that '*the EU favours the insertion of a mechanism to increase the ambition of mitigation commitments once they are inscribed into the agreement'* (European Parliament, 2014). Furthermore, this international agreement does not only concern national governments: it involves all stakeholders, seeking commitment from the private sector and local governments, who are key actors in both mitigation and adaptation, with a strong potential to mobilise additional resources.

The EU, with some developing countries, aims at setting **international rules to ensure that the 2015 global climate deal will be legally binding**. The exact form of the 2015 climate agreement is still under discussion (Bodansky *et al.,* 2014). A key challenge will be designing a legally binding instrument that is fit for purpose and capable of evolving without having to be negotiated every time, while at the same time

18 This stepwise approach consists of four steps: first, all Parties should define their commitments in a transparent manner (2013); second, all Parties should formulate and propose commitments in Warsaw (2014); third, the Parties' proposed commitments should be internationally assessed (2014/2015); and, fourth, all commitments should be inscribed in the 2015 Agreement (Lithuania and the European Commission. 2013).

19 http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2013/nov/25/warsaw-climate-talks-end-cop19-2015.

20 http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/nov/16/g20-brisbane-final-communique-lists-800-measures-for-economic-growth.

21 http://eeas.europa.eu/statements-eeas/2015/150119_05_en.htm.

22 http://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document.html?reference=IPOL_STU(2014)536288. See also: http://unfccc.int/files/bodies/awg/application/pdf/el-05-28-adp_ws1_submission.pdf.

dealing with both mitigation and adaptation. It is also required to create an enforcement mechanism (compliance mechanism) to implement this agreement; otherwise there is a chance that it will not yield sufficient results to win the climate change battle. The principle of "optionality" could allow some elements to be mandatory and others optional (through either opt-out and opt-in procedures), but this is still under discussion. Recently, important global commitments have been made by other major emitters: China has promised to increase the use of zero-emission sources to 20% by 2030, while the US has pledged to cut its emissions to 26-28% below 2005 levels by 2025.[23] The US-China bilateral climate deal on emissions cuts, put forward in November 2014, is an example of game changing alliances based on common interests and positions.[24] It will be a challenge though to have the US and other large countries ratify a legally binding international agreement.[25]

In the October 2014 Council Conclusions issued ahead of the Lima COP20, the EU stated that **climate finance** should be mobilised *'in the context of meaningful mitigation actions and transparency of implementation'*. These Conclusions acknowledged that *'action on adaptation must be a central part of a balanced agreement since all countries need to undertake actions to adapt to the adverse effects of climate change'*. However, what "a central part" means remains undefined. Moreover, "mitigation" gets a stronger focus in the Council Conclusions, being mentioned 19 times, while "adaptation" is mentioned 4 times (Council of the European Union, 2014). This raises the concern that more of the EU's climate finance will continue to be dedicated to mitigation than to adaptation: over the period 2003-2012, EuropeAid allocated 42% of climate finance to adaptation, whereas 58% went to mitigation (European Court of Auditors, 2013).

In fact, during the period 2010-12, the EU and its member states were the largest contributors to mitigation- and adaptation-related Official Development Assistance (ODA), within the total share of 51% of ODA for climate change from all OECD donors (European Commission, 2014a). On the other hand, the report noted that the Commission has managed the climate-related support funded from the EU budget and the European Development Fund (EDF) well. Finally, for the period 2014-2020, the EU has committed to allocating 20% of its entire funding budget to climate change activities, inside and outside the EU.[26]

The **EU showed ambition in Lima, but it could not reach all its objectives**: the EU urged for a mechanism to mutually review other countries' pledges, but emerging economies refused it. In Warsaw, the EU had shown a conservative stance on climate finance (Oberthür and Groen, 2014),[27] but in Lima, it was more proactive: nearly 50% of the GCF is pledged by EU member states. Furthermore, the EU's position on the GCF was that emerging economies (China in particular) should also make contributions towards this target, according to their responsibilities and capacities, and also that the contributions of developed countries should be differentiated, in line with the changed context of CBDR.

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23 http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/nov/14/the-china-us-climate-change-agreement-is-a-step-forward-for-green-power-relations.
24 http://www.ceps.be/publications/us-china-joint-announcement-climate-change-can-g2-make-difference.
25 http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2015/mar/31/us-set-to-propose-emissions-cuts-of-28-ahead-of-global-climate-treaty
26 For an analysis of EU's climate finance, see: http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/budget/index_en.htm.
27 Whereas developing countries (along with the LMDCs) requested a clear roadmap for the scaling up of developed countries' financial contributions by 2020, and some of them asked for an interim target of US$ 70 billion by 2016 (to reach the total of US$100 billion by 2020), the EU could not present such a roadmap and opposed that target.

2.2.3. Challenges and opportunities in climate policymaking in the EU

The EU, which is responsible for a large part of historical GHG emissions, has taken consequential measures to fulfil its mitigation commitments made under the UNFCCC. Four milestone agreements regarding energy generation and consumption are worth pointing out: first, the EU has taken actions within the framework of the **2020 Climate and Energy Package** adopted in 2007 that aimed at cutting carbon emissions by 20%, a 20% market share for renewable energies, and a 20% improvement in energy efficiency. To deliver on the "20-20-20 targets", various instruments were developed: in 2005, the EU launched the Emissions Trading System (ETS) system, which serves to incentivise decarbonisation in Europe and promotes a global carbon market (ETTG, 2014). Lauded as a success, the EU saw the ETS as an opportunity to become a world leader in low-carbon and renewable technologies (Herrero and Knaepen, 2014). However, despite several concrete achievements (for example, the ETS has been implemented in other countries), the ETS has also been criticised for being dysfunctional: the fall in industrial production and conventional energy demand has led to the rapid build-up of a surplus of emission allowances, over the needs of industries participating in the ETS. In addition, the EU has given away too many allowances, since many industries have been classified as being at risk of "carbon leakage" and have received free allowances. This has resulted in a huge overcapacity in the carbon market and a steep fall in the price of allowances. The European Commission proposed to delay the auctioning of 900m tonnes of additional allowances and to reintroduce them later, when demand would be higher, but the European Parliament voted down this proposal (Zachmann, 2013).

Second, in 2011, the European Commission issued the **Energy Roadmap 2050**,[28] committing the EU to reduce its GHG emissions by 80 to 95% of their 1990 level by 2050 to limit the rise in global temperature to 2°C, in accordance with the IPCC's recommendations (IPCC, 2007). This implies a decarbonisation of most of the EU economy over three decades. The EU and its member states have provided large amounts of public support to renewable energies. The share of renewable energies in the EU energy supply had risen to 13% as of 2011. Energy consumption recently stabilised and is projected to go down in the coming years (Cecilia 2050, 2013).

The **EU member states have almost achieved their target of reducing GHG emissions by 20% of their 1990 level**, as emissions have dropped by 18% as of 2012, well ahead of the 2020 target date. The economic downturn since 2008 however explains a great deal of the fall in EU emissions.[29] In addition, the numbers should be read carefully, as EU member states have often delocalised carbon-intensive activities offshore, which have led to reduced emissions per targets set, but making zero impact on global emissions.[30]

Both the EU Energy Strategy 2020 and the Energy Roadmap 2050 emphasise that the **ultimate goal of EU's energy market is to integrate renewable energy sources and to create a single EU market for cheap, clean and secure electricity**. The European Investment Bank (EIB) plays an increasingly important role to support investments for the development and modernisation of Europe's electricity network infrastructure. In 2012, the EIB lent approximately EUR4 billion to the energy sector.[31]

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28 http://ec.europa.eu/energy/energy2020/roadmap/index_en.htm.
29 The 20-20-20 targets of the Climate and Energy Package adopted in 2007 set the goals of cutting GHG emissions by at least 20%, meet 20% of energy consumption in the EU with renewable energies and reduce primary energy use by 20% by improving energy efficiency (http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/package/index_en.htm).
30 http://www.etuc.org/issue/energy-climate-change
31 http://www.eib.org/projects/priorities/energy/.

Third, in October 2014, the European Council agreed on an ambitious **2030 Climate and Energy Package** for the period 2020-30.[32] This framework sets EU-wide objectives, most notably, a **reduction in GHG emissions of at least 40% by 2030** (compared to their 1990 level) and **a binding target of 27% of renewable energies in the energy supply**. These binding targets are to be achieved at the EU level, not in member states individually. Requirements at the member state-level will depend on circumstances, allowing for flexibility in the ways they comply with GHG emissions reduction and renewable energy targets.[33] Under this new framework, member states will formulate and implement national strategies guaranteeing their energy security and fulfilling their obligations to contribute to these EU-wide objectives. The EC is preparing a proposed distribution of emission abatement efforts among member states. However, **the adoption of the 2030 Climate and Energy Package has been challenging:** the supporters of the current Package are the wealthiest member states.[34] Some of them, notably Sweden and the United Kingdom (UK), were actually in favour of an even higher emissions reduction target. Central and Eastern European member states (the coal-reliant states) have been reluctant to adopt those goals.[35] These two groups face different trade-offs between environmental sustainability, competitiveness and energy security. With the Lisbon Treaty, energy policy became a domain of joint EU-member states' competence, but member states have kept a great deal of autonomy in this area (Gavas, 2013).[36] However, national competitiveness, energy security concerns, a lack of coordination of energy supply and security strategies have often derailed common positions for climate and energy policies. A report (2012) of the European Court of Auditors showed that public investments for energy efficiency under the previous Multi-Annual Financial Framework have had little impact (European Court of Auditors, 2012). Member states have used different modalities to support the deployment of renewable energies. This has segmented the European market, creating inefficiencies. Therefore, **the EU will have to improve the efficiency and stability of the European energy market.** This can be done through, for instance, a better integration and enhanced efficiency of electricity and gas markets, or the creation of taxes on the carbon content of traded goods. The latter could also help to reduce the risks associated with dependence on Russian gas (Loskot-Strachota and Zachmann, 2014).

Finally, in his political statement presented for the European Parliament in October 2014, President Juncker expressed the concern that *'Europe relies too heavily on fuel and gas imports' (Juncker, 2014)*. As a response to that, the Commission announced its **European Energy Union Strategy** on 25th February 2015. This Strategy aims for a single energy market amidst energy insecurity. An integrated energy market may assist in overcoming the EU's challenge to speak with one voice (European Commission, 2015a). However, the Strategy has been criticised, mostly by the green activists, for focusing too much on finding new supply routes for gas and reviving nuclear power and for not ruling out coal.[37] The Strategy was accompanied by the **'Road to Paris' Communication** (European Commission, 2015b). This document **puts forward the EU's position on the Paris Protocol**. This includes: global emissions should be

[32] http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/145356.pdf.
[33] Some countries, including Denmark and Germany, are in favour of national binding targets for emissions, renewable energies and energy savings, whereas other countries including the UK want to have EU-wide binding targets only, which would provide flexibility to countries in the way their contribute to GHG emissions abatement, including through the ETS, and design their energy and other relevant policies (http://www.euractiv.com/sections/eu-priorities-2020/eu-leaders-adopt-flexible-energy-and-climate-targets-2030-309462) .
[34] The Green Growth Group, consisting of 13 member states, supports an ambitious 2030 climate and energy framework (http://www.energypost.eu/eu-divided-2030-climate-energy-policy/)
[35] The cost of carbon dioxide (CO_2) emissions allowances currently is so low that it has in some places become more profitable to operate coal-fired power plants than gas-fired ones. The decline in coal prices compared to gas currently has also encouraged the coal-based power generation. For instance, in Germany, since 2011 there has been an increase in output from coal-fired power plants and a decrease in output from gas-fired ones. This depressed carbon market has disrupted firms' plans for investments in low-carbon and energy-efficient technologies (including capture-and-storage technologies, which have yet to emerge in Europe). Since 2012, utility companies have had to mothball sizeable gas-fired generation capacity (Loskot-Strachota and Zachmann, 2014).
[36] The 2007 Climate and Energy Package, when converted into binding European law in 2009, should have ensured that national policies are coherent among themselves within the EU.
[37] http://www.europeanvoice.com/article/energy-union-strategy-the-reaction/.

reduced by at least 60% below 2010 levels by 2050; there should be a global review for every five years; transparency and accountability should be strengthened; adaptation is equally important as mitigation, with a required special role of the land use sector; there should be public as well as private investments. In the end, credibility on the global climate scene depends on the EU's internal low carbon energy achievements. Environmental advocates, such as Greenpeace, say that *'the EU wants its climate policies to become a model for global green development, but is decelerating its commitments, while China and the US are catching up fast. EU governments should increase their carbon emission pledge'.*[38]

2.3. Africa's engagement in international climate policymaking

2.3.1. The Africa Group within the UNFCCC: from the "Global South" to an African coalition[39]

The **Africa Group of Negotiators** (AGN) entered the picture at the Rio Earth Summit in 1992, when the UNFCCC was established, to promote the common interests of African countries in the climate negotiations. For a long time, however, African interests were mainly represented by the **Group of 77 and China** (G77), a broad coalition of developing countries that had emerged under the UN Conference on Trade and Development in the 1960s to promote their economic and commercial interests and increase their weight in UN negotiations. The G77 played a prominent role in the UNFCCC negotiations early on, fiercely upholding the CBDR and RC principles (Roger, 2013). Under the G77, African countries formulated common negotiating positions and formed partnerships supporting adaptation and mitigation initiatives in Africa. Within the G77 other coalitions comprising African states played a role in the negotiations, notably the **Least Developed Countries (LDCs)**, and the **BASIC countries** (Brazil, South Africa, India and China), which shaped the Copenhagen Accord according to their views.

Over the past decade African Parties have strengthened their ability to promote their interests as a group at the UNFCCC. Although the AGN has been far less prominent in the negotiations than the G77 or the BASIC group, it has made remarkable strides towards becoming an influential group since the KP came into force (Roger, 2013). **South Africa** has contributed a great deal to the AGN's negotiating capacity, its influence, and its relations with other Parties.[40] However, the vast majority of African delegations have been handicapped by inadequate resources, a deficit of scientific evidence and strategic information, and weak institutional capacity. The fact that the AGN does not have a permanent secretariat has also hampered its role.

The positions promoted by the AGN at the UNFCCC are determined through an institutional mechanism in which the **African Ministerial Conference on the Environment** (AMCEN) plays a central role. AMCEN convenes biennially to provide African ministers of environment the opportunity to discuss issues of common concern and formulate joint strategies to address environmental issues.[41] In 2009, following the deliberations of AMCEN, the African Union (AU) expressed an African consensus on climate change and a common African position in the UNFCCC negotiations[42] for the first time, which provided African negotiators with a clear mandate for the Copenhagen COP (AU/AMCEN, 2009). At that time, AMCEN also

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[38] http://www.greenpeace.org/eu-unit/en/News/2014/EU-2030-targets-just-an-opening-bid--more-carbon-cuts-required-ahead-of-Paris-summit/.

[39] For more details, see: Ramsamy, Knoll, Knaepen and van Wyk, 2014.

[40] The AGN is made of technical negotiators from all African countries. A country is selected to chair the AGN for a period of two years.

[41] Currently the secretariat of AMCEN is at the United Nations Environmental Programme's Regional Office for Africa in Nairobi, Kenya. In principle, the African Union Commission should host it but it does not have adequate resources to support AMCEN's operations and to lead environmental policy at the continental level.

[42] This common African position was adopted in Algiers on 21 November 2008, revised at a Special Session of AMCEN in Nairobi on 29 May 2009, and endorsed by the Thirteenth AU Summit in Sirte, Libya, on 1-3 July 2009.

adopted a common strategy to tackle climate change in Africa following the recommendations of its expert group.

At the highest level, **the Conference of African Heads of State and Government on Climate Change (CAHOSCC)** endorses common negotiating positions formulated by AMCEN. This forum was established in 2009 to represent the AU in high-level international political dialogues on climate change, in particular at ministerial meetings of the UNFCCC, and to make decisions at the COP on its behalf.[43] CAHOSCC was intended to facilitate communication between policymakers and UNFCCC negotiators and to allow the latter to effectively engage in the negotiations, in a coordinated way and with a well-defined mandate (Roger, 2013). The AU Commission (AUC) has strived to coordinate many Africa institutions through CAHOSCC to ensure that they speak with one voice at the UNFCCC. In its role of coordinator, the AUC liaises with national technical negotiators, ministerial committees and continental bodies to facilitate the engagement of African Parties and the formulation of common negotiating positions in the three Rio Conventions (including the UNFCCC).[44] However, it has had difficulty in reconciling the views of diverse African countries (especially between major oil producers and the others, and between middle-income countries and LDCs) and regional economic communities, and in identifying common priorities (Hoste, 2009; Hoste and Anderson, 2011).

Figure 2: Process to develop a common position in the UNFCCC negotiations for the Africa Group



Source: compiled by the authors based on interviews with representatives of various African institutions, including the AGN

Consultations to formulate common negotiating positions at the UNFCCC typically follow the process illustrated in Figure 1. The relations among the AGN, AMCEN and CAHOSCC are supposed to ensure that the positions decided upon by AMCEN and endorsed by the AU, through CAHOSCC, are well informed. In preparation of recent COP, this process has appeared as one of the most thorough and inclusive among all groups represented at the UNFCCC. According to African observers, it constitutes the cornerstone of Africa's engagement in the negotiation of the 2015 agreement.

To deal with a wide range of technical matters, the Chair of the AGN relies on "lead coordinators" who represent the AGN in the various work streams of the UNFCCC (mitigation, adaptation, climate finance, technology, and so forth). These coordinators provide guidance to the country delegations and try to harmonise their views so as to reach clear, common positions, which is a challenging task given the diversity of African countries in terms of exposure to climate change, vulnerability, developmental

43 CAHOSCC currently comprises the HSG of Algeria, Ethiopia, Kenya, Mauritius, Mozambique, Nigeria, the Republic of Congo and Uganda; the current Chair of the AU, the Chair of the AU Commission, the Chair of AMCEN and the Chair of the AGN; and negotiators and experts from AU member states. The current Coordinator of CAHOSCC is the President of the Republic of Tanzania (http://appablog.wordpress.com/2012/12/04/cahoscc-meeting-in-doha-cooperation-coordination-and-cohesion-around-the-african-common-position/).

44 Pers. comm with representative of AUC Department of Rural Economy and Agriculture (April 2014).

attainment, and culture.[45] Without this arrangement, most African delegations could not stay abreast of all UNFCCC processes.[46] Still, as a former Chair of the AGN explained, the task of reviewing the many submissions of Parties in all work streams and obtaining input from AGN members is particularly burdensome for the Chair and the lead coordinators. High staff turnover in country delegations, the lack of available experts, and language barriers further complicate the work of the AGN (Makina, 2013).

The African Development Bank (AfDB) has provided substantial financial and technical assistance to the African institutions involved in the negotiations since 2008 (AfDB, 2012). It has delivered analysis and training to the AGN, facilitated meetings of the AGN to prepare for UNFCCC conferences, and sponsored negotiators to attend COP. Another key partner of the AGN is the African Climate Policy Centre (ACPC) hosted by the UN Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), which has delivered climate information, technical advice and capacity building activities. Although this support has been effective in enhancing the AGN's ability to promote the interests of African Parties, **the AGN still lacks technical capacity to formulate robust and independent arguments in the negotiations**. It often relies on external partners rather than internal knowledge resources to assess the impacts of climate change, formulate policy responses, and assess financial and technical needs. Other organisations have supported Africa's engagement in international climate policy processes, notably the Pan-African Climate Justice Alliance, a coalition of civil society organisations, and the Conference on Climate Change and Development in Africa (CCDA).

2.3.2. Current negotiating positions of the Africa Group

African countries have consolidated their common position in the UNFCCC negotiations in recent years. The Africa Group favours a legally binding agreement applicable to all Parties to the UNFCCC as the main institutional arrangement to tackle climate change at the global level. It has consistently stressed that this agreement should abide by the CBDR principles and should be equitable. In a statement prepared for the 2014 UN Climate Summit[47], **AU HSG re-affirmed that the 2015 climate agreement should include commitments to support adaptation in vulnerable countries**.

African Parties support the goal to stabilise atmospheric concentrations of GHG so as to avoid warming beyond 2°C. They ask developed countries to commit to reducing the bulk of GHG emissions and they want to have sufficient leeway to increase their own GHG emissions so as to attain their development objectives. The Africa Group has expressed its concern that current commitments of developed countries are insufficient in comparison to the emissions cuts required to limit warning to 2°C and that global mitigation efforts driven by developed countries could hinder growth and poverty reduction in Africa. In their statement at the 2014 UN Climate Summit, **AU HSG urged UNFCCC Parties to ratify the Doha Amendment to the KP and enforce the commitments of industrialised countries for the second commitment period (2013-20)**, although as of November 2014 only four African countries had ratified it (South Africa, Sudan, Morocco and Kenya).

The Africa Group has asserted the willingness of African Parties to contribute to mitigation efforts. A large part of the African continent is covered by forests, which serve as carbon sinks. Africa could further contribute to the capture of carbon through its forests than in a business-as-usual scenario. Although most African economies could not make significant cuts in their GHG emissions without jeopardising their growth prospects, African Parties have affirmed their commitment to aim to low-carbon growth paths.

45 During or after UNFCCC meetings, lead coordinators also inform the group about sessions that not all national delegations could attend, as in most cases only one or two delegates usually represent an African country. http://cdkn.org/2014/01/opinion-former-agn-chair-reflects-on-representing-a-strong-african-voice-in-climate-negotiations/?loclang=en_gb.

46 Pers. comm. with a member of the AGN and UNFCCC country focal point (April 2014).

47 http://cpauc.au.int/en/content/statement-Chairperson-African-Union-Commission-HE-Dr-Nkosazana-Dlamini-Zuma-CAHOSCC.

African Parties have vehemently lobbied for the "polluter-pays" principle to determine the contributions of different Parties in tackling climate change. **They wish to have access to climate finance, technology** (through technical cooperation, investment in research and development,and so forth.) **and capacity building to support adaptation, reduce vulnerability and fulfil their mitigation commitments while remaining able to pursue their economic growth objectives.** These transfers should be adequate in size, predictable and consistent over time, both in the pre- and post-2020 periods. Yet, as an AU official expressed it, African Parties are concerned about being unduly subjected to conditions for receiving climate finance. This AU official also added: *'There should not be any conditionality, but there should be minimum requirements, such as NAMAs [Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions]. Also, certain institutional arrangements, such as focal points at the ministerial level and so forth, should be required. Moreover, Africans claim that there should be a just balance between finance for mitigation and finance for adaptation, 50%-50%'*.'[48]

The Africa Group has also identified priority intervention areas to support adaptation, notably **agriculture, food security, poverty reduction and social and economic development, including resilient infrastructures. Furthermore, during COP19,** they pushed for a proposal requiring developed countries to support the loss and damage mechanism, especially for the agricultural sector, which was among the topics debated at the previous CCDA. The call has long since been made for the need to transform Africa's agriculture sector from one of historically low productivity to one that is a high-potential driver of economic development, drawing on technological and systemic improvements to foster sustainable agricultural growth and productivity.[49] Given this importance of agriculture as the mainstay of the majority of people in Africa and a priority area in need of urgent action for the continent, it must be treated under adaptation in the mechanisms of the UNFCCC because of its importance to food security and livelihood support.[50]

The engagement of political leaders has contributed to the definition of an African approach to climate change and a high degree of political recognition at continental level for the threat of climate change. Among African champions in the fight against climate change are the former President of Ghana, John Kufuor, who was appointed UN Special Envoy on Climate Change ahead of the 2014 UN Climate Summit; the President of Tanzania, Jakaya Kikwete; the late Prime Minister of Ethiopia, Meles Zenawi; the President of Benin, Yayi Boni, a staunch advocate of the climate change cause; and the President of Mozambique, Armando Guebuza.[51] However, in many African countries policymakers and other political leaders are often poorly informed about climate policy issues and climate change is not viewed as a priority area with regards to economic and social development[52] Much work is still needed to engage local levels of African policymaking and implementation to concretely address how climate funds and policy frameworks can impact livelihoods development and support demand-led alternatives to strict natural resource management regimes.[53]

48 Pers. comm. with AU official (April 2014).

49 This is underscored by the AU Summit in Malabo, Equatorial Guinea, in June 2014 which put forward the Malabo Declaration on "Accelerated Agricultural Growth and Transformation for shared Prosperity and Improved Livelihoods" wherein African HSG commit to, amongst others: enhancing investment finance for inclusive agricultural growth and transformation; eliminate child under-nutrition with a view to bringing down stunting to 10% and underweight to 5% by 2025; to establish/strengthen inclusive PPPs for at least five priority agricultural value chains (http://reliefweb.int/report/world/committee-african-heads-state-and-government-climate-change-meet-malabo).

50 At the Malabo Summit, African HSG prioritised Climate Smart Agriculture in terms of NEPAD NPCA and the implementation of CAADP which has matured over the past 10 years into an agenda for socio-economic transformation and expanded it's scope to integrate climate change into CAADP national investment plans. However, regional strategies are still needed to realise the vision of climate resilient approaches to development at the regional scale (http://www.nepad.org/fr/climatechangeandsustainabledevelopment/news/3645/africa-climate-smart-agriculture-alliance-launched).

51 Pers. Comm. with staff member of the Africa Climate Policy Centre, UNECA (May 2014).

52 Pers. Comm. with staff member of the AGN and Swaziland UNFCCC Focal Point (May 2014).

53 Pers. Comm. with AUC Directorate for Rural Economy and Agriculture (May 2014).

Even though Africa has appeared as a more cohesive group since the Copenhagen COP, signs of fragmentation among African Parties have persisted and their common position has proven fragile in several instances. This has generally weakened the group's influence in the negotiations. At COP16 in Cancun in 2010, African political leaders displayed significantly different views, especially among regional powers, whereas technical negotiators seemed united. Those disaccords most likely reflect political motivations and are linked to various factors, including development status, geographic situation, oil endowments,and so forth.[54] South Africa, which ranks 12th in terms of GHG emissions (US Energy Information Administration, 2014), is an example of dissension within the Africa Group. The alignment of South Africa with the BASIC countries and its prominent role in shaping the Copenhagen Accord along with these countries have brought about accusations of betrayal of African interests. Its rapprochement with other emerging economies, notably South Africa's growing political and economic relations with China, have raised fears that it would compromise its neighbours' interests in favour of its own (Atteridge, 2011). The large emerging economies in the G77 and China group, whose delegations at the COP have increasingly equipped themselves for the negotiations, have gained considerable influence in the negotiations. At the same time their interests and also their responsibilities in relation to their GHG emissions have made their association with other G77 countries more tenuous (Masters, 2014).

Despite those fault lines, African countries formed a united front at COP17 in Durban to push for a comprehensive legally binding agreement for the post-2020 period, allying with European countries, the LDC group and Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) and pressuring the big emerging economies and recalcitrant developed states to accept the Durban Platform (Roger, 2013). African Parties made a significant contribution in the deliberations at COP17, which led to progress in the negotiations, notably through the reconciliatory role of South Africa.

2.3.3. Challenges and opportunities in climate policymaking in Africa

Africa faces high costs of adaptation and damages to repair due to climate change. The 2013 *Africa's Adaptation Gap Technical Report* shows that adaptation costs range from US$7 to US$15 billion per year from 2014 to 2020 (UNEP, 2013a). After 2020, these costs could rise steeply. **Even if the increase in global average temperature were held under 2°C, adaptation costs for Africa would hover around US$35 billion per year by 2050 and US$200 billion per year in the 2070s.** Given current GHG emissions trends, which could cause an increase in temperature of nearly 4°C, adaptation to climate change and incurred damages would cost 4% of Africa's gross domestic product (GDP) by the end of the century. In a scenario with a 2°C increase in temperature, this cost would be 1% of GDP.

African countries have taken actions to avoid the adverse impacts of climate change. They have undertaken interventions to support sustainable natural resources management and economic development in vulnerable, semi-arid regions such as the Great Green Wall for the Sahara and the Sahel Initiative (GGWSSI); improve the resilience of agriculture and rural communities; build infrastructures resistant to extreme weather events; develop insurance schemes to mitigate climatic risk; implement disaster risk reduction strategies; and so forth. Such interventions are costly and promoting adaptation will require substantial public and private investments, targeting vulnerable economic sectors and populations. **African countries have also contributed to mitigation efforts, notably through the adoption of low-carbon energy technologies and measures to reduce deforestation and forest degradation** (in

[54] For instance, in Cancun, Kenyan officials' declarations appeared to be in line with Japanese officials', which some observers have linked to Japan's plans to invest in transport and oil infrastructures between Kenya and South Sudan. Similarly, in Copenhagen, Sudan may have been lured into breaking away from the African Common Position by the prospects of Chinese investments (Hoste, 2011).

particular through the REDD+ programme). **African policymakers will have to face the challenge of supporting adaptation strategies and mitigation efforts in ways that support (or at least do not impede) economic and social development, stimulating economic growth, creating jobs and contributing to the modernization of African economies.**

Although discussions about adaptation to climate change in Africa in international forums often emphasise large technical and financial assistance requirements, the availability of resources may not always constitute the most binding constraint to the implementation of effective policies in African countries (a number of cooperation programmes have already been established) (Lockwood, 2013). **These countries also need the capacity to access available climate finance and use it effectively ("climate finance readiness"), which is missing among many African countries.** This constraint was discussed at a recent Chatham House event on climate policy in November 2014.[55] More political will, greater responsiveness of policymakers to the needs of vulnerable populations, and forward-looking policies are needed. On the other hand, providers of climate finance will have to ensure that climate finance is delivered through effective modalities, following practices akin to aid effectiveness principles (even though climate finance is usually seen as distinct from traditional development assistance), so as to avoid detrimental effects on development.

Well-defined policy frameworks at the national, regional and continental levels could ensure that climate finance is effective, with cross-sectorial coordination mechanisms in place, clear results framework and robust accountability mechanisms. However, the fragility of links among policymakers, negotiators and experts has hindered the development of strategic planning capacities of national governments and regional institutions in the area of climate change for adaptation, mitigation and engagement in multilateral negotiations. At the national level, climate finance often goes to ministries of planning or ministries of finance. Ministries in charge of planning and implementing environmental policy or ministries of agriculture do not control climate-related disbursements, which could pose a challenge to climate finance effectiveness.[56] At the regional level, initiatives such as the Regional Flagship Programmes led by AMCEN could provide useful policy frameworks to ensure that international climate finance is effective.[57]

[55] Chatham House, 2014. Climate Change: Raising Ambition, Delivering Results. Conference. 3-4 November 2014. London. http://www.chathamhouse.org/conferences/ClimateChange14. See also: http://www.odi.org/projects/2735-climate-finance-readiness.

[56] Pers. Comm. with EC Officer, DG CLIMA, EC (February 2014) and staff member of the South African Department of Environmental Affairs (May 2014).

[57] The overall coordinating body for Africa's priority programmes on environment is NEPAD NPCA as designated by AMCEN. NEPAD is the coordinating institution and host secretariat for the five Regional flagship Programmes. The Regional flagship Programmes are Africa's response towards implementing the outcomes of the Rio+20 sustainable development summit. The flagships are to be implemented within the overall framework of the NEPAD Environment Action Plan (http://www.nepad.org/climatechangeandsustainabledevelopment/knowledge/doc/1463/action-plan-environment-initiative).

3. The Joint Africa-EU Strategy: An enabler of a common agenda on climate change?

3.1. Africa-EU relations in transition

The Joint Africa-EU Strategy (JAES), adopted at the 2007 Lisbon Summit, was intended to play a pivotal role in Africa-EU relations. According to official documents, a fundamental motive for the JAES on both sides was to establish a more political and strategic partnership than preceding frameworks for Africa-EU relations (AU-EU, 2007). This partnership would be based on common values and interests, pursuing peace, security, human rights, democratic governance, economic and social development, and environmental sustainability on both continents. It would also do away with the traditional donor-recipient relationship. The JAES would provide a platform for political dialogue and cooperation in areas beyond development cooperation and trade, which until then had usually been dealt with under the ACP-EU Cotonou Partnership Agreement. As Mangala (2013) remarked, the JAES can be seen as a response to several challenges caused by a rapidly changing geopolitical context, including: Africa's rising importance in the global economy and international institutions, Europe's need for natural and energy resources, deepening continental integration in Africa, mounting security and strategic concerns, and the increasing role of China and other emerging economies in Africa.

One of the novelties of the JAES was its aim to tackle global challenges, notably climate change, through strengthened political dialogue and cooperation between Africa and the EU in a multilateral context. The framework of the JAES seemed fit to that purpose as the global response to climate change required cooperation at different levels. Initially, the **Partnership on Climate Change** (PCC), one of the eight thematic partnerships of the JAES, formulated a number of actions to support African negotiators' engagement in the multilateral climate negotiations and implement adaptation and mitigation measures. The Partnership on Energy too was intended to contribute to the response to climate change. For the EU, the PCC potentially could build up the web of political and diplomatic relations it had weaved to foster coalitions of the willing in the UNFCCC negotiations and implement the international climate regime. For Africa, this partnership with Europe offered the opportunity to strengthen its role in the negotiations and further develop its continental approach to fighting climate change.

3.2. The JAES partnership on climate change: What has been done and what has been done well?

As an African interviewee claimed: '*climate change has received increasing attention during [JAES] meetings […] and it is one of areas where concrete actions have been implemented*'. The Joint Africa-EU Declaration on Climate Change issued by the AU and the EU in 2008 was a first outcome of the climate change partnership (JAES, 2008). [58] This declaration, which was crafted ahead of COP14 in Poznan in 2008, called for African and EU actors to fight climate change on the basis of the CBDR principle (JAES, 2008). It referred to equity as a key principle of international climate policy and emphasised adaptation needs, especially in Africa. It also underscored that in the international climate regime African countries should have adequate access to UNFCCC market mechanisms, including REDD+, capacity building measures, and climate finance (the declaration mentioned the need to improve the effectiveness of

[58] In 2008, at the first EU-South Africa Summit in Bordeaux, France, the EU and South Africa also made a joint Declaration on Climate Change in which they agreed on a list of actions to address climate change, including cooperation in the area of low-carbon technologies. For more information, see http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_PRES-08-222_en.htm.

climate finance instruments, notably the Adaptation Fund (AF) and the Global Environment Facility (GEF)). African stakeholders were actively involved in the negotiations of the PCC, especially for matters of financial assistance for adaptation, strongly arguing for 'new and additional' climate finance commitments (Sicurelli, 2013).

The French and Moroccan governments were the lead institutions of the PCC on the European and African sides. On the EU side, the DG Climate Action, DG Development and Cooperation (DEVCO) and DG Environment of the EC engaged in the dialogue conducted under this partnership, contributing to its strategic orientation. The DG DEVCO led the implementation of the activities planned under the PCC.[59] Other EU member states were involved in the PCC. On the African side, the AUC, the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), the African Development Bank (AfDB) and other African actors were involved in the planning and implementation of the PCC.

Subsequently, an Action Plan was drawn up to implement the political commitments made in the Declaration over the period 2008-10 (see Annex 2). **A major goal of the actions planned under the PCC was to elaborate a common approach to fighting climate change and cooperate to define a new international climate regime through the UNFCCCC.** For that purpose, the AU and the EU established a dialogue to prepare for the Copenhagen COP. **This initiative eventually fell flat as the two Parties held diverging views on the terms of the prospective agreement and dissensions within both the Africa Group and the EU hindered their cooperation** (Sicurelli, 2013). This led to a deadlock in their search for a common agenda. The first Action Plan also aimed to strengthen the capacity of African countries to participate in the international carbon market, particularly the UNFCCC CDM. This goal was pursued through the Climate for Development in Africa (ClimDev-Africa) Programme.

ClimDev-Africa, jointly led by the AUC (Climate Change and Desertification Unit), the United Nations Economic Commissions for Africa (UNECA), the ACPC and the AfDB, has provided African actors with climatic information—including Earth observation services, scientific and technical support, and advocacy to improve decision-making concerning climate change. The EU and other donors (notably the UK and Sweden) have supported this programme. Through the AUC, which has developed the African Strategy on Climate Change, ClimDev-Africa has guided African actors (public institutions, civil society organisations (CSOs) and private actors) in integrating adaptation and mitigation objectives and actions into their development strategies, building capacity for climate-related policy planning and implementation (including the formulation of positions in the UNFCCC negotiations) and mobilising resources. ClimDev-Africa has focused on some sectors, notably agriculture, where adaptation needs are greater than in others. Despite a tedious start, **ClimDev-Africa appears to have effectively built capacities within its own bodies as well as in African institutions to use climate information for evidence-based policymaking in relation to climate change.**[60] This has probably contributed to informing the dialogue on climate change between Africa and Europe. Some critics have said that donors have driven this programme more than was necessary, which may have diminished its effectiveness (Sicurelli, 2013).

A third priority of the first Action Plan was the fight against land degradation and desertification as well as adaptation in agriculture. The climate change partnership would support the implementation of the **Global Climate Change Alliance** (GCCA) in Africa and the **Great Green Wall for the Sahara and the Sahel Initiative** (GGWSSI). The GGWSSI, led by 11 countries bordering the Sahara to the South, with support from multiple African and development partners, primarily aims to fight land degradation and desertification and promote economic and social development in the Sahel zone. This initiative originally

59 Pers. comm. with staff member of the DG DEVCO, EC (February 2014).
60 Pers. comm. with officers of the ACPC and the AUC's Permanent Mission to the EU (April 2014).

aimed at establishing a 15-kilometer-wide strip of vegetation across the continent, from Senegal to Djibouti, but over time its objectives have broadened to encompass poverty reduction and food security.[61] This initiative benefitted from a sense of ownership by African actors and a willingness to cooperate regionally, which explains its success according to some African observers. Following the start of its implementation in 2011, a regional strategy, country action plans and a transnational action plan for Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger were adopted. **The GGWSSI has succeeded in raising awareness about sustainable land management challenges and in attracting African and international support** (including international climate finance). The EU has supported the GGWSSI, notably policy processes and capacity development activities, through an AUC-led project (Capacity Development Strategy and Action Plan in Support of the Implementation of the GGWSSI), in cooperation with multilateral organisations (FAO, 2013). It has channelled significant financial support through the GCCA.

In 2010, the JAES established a second Action Plan for the period 2011-13 and on this occasion the PCC was renamed the **Partnership on Climate Change and the Environment** (PCCE). The PCCE continued to support ClimDev-Africa and the GGWSSI. New cooperation areas and activities were added and the partnership's implementation modalities were improved, in particular those for adaptation measures, capacity development for African climate negotiators and forest conservation measures (JAES, 2010).

The JAES has given African and EU actors an opportunity to formulate common objectives and approaches for several climate-related policy processes. The climate change partnership also provided a forum where they certainly had opportunities to discuss issues related to UNFCCC processes[62] and gain a better understanding of the (actual and perceived) risks posed by climate change both on the African and European continents, adaptation needs and appropriate responses. Overall, **this partnership might have improved the communication among African and EU actors and the coherence among some of their joint actions related to climate change compared to a situation without the JAES.** For example, ClimDev-Africa provided analyses of the impacts of climate change to the stakeholders of GCCA-sponsored policy dialogues, which in turn may have enhanced the planning of adaptation interventions in Africa such as the GGWSSI.

However, the general perception is that the climate change partnership did not fulfil its promises. '*So far the cooperation between the AU and the EU has been good […] but there has been a lack of results and political decisions*' an African interviewee admitted discussing the climate change partnership. As for the JAES in general, this partnership mostly remained a forum where talks were not followed by appropriate actions and concrete outcomes (CONCORD, 2013). The African party's unwillingness to make a second joint declaration on climate change in 2010, to the dismay of both insiders and outsiders, indicated a failure of this PCC. Besides advances in the implementation of ClimDev-Africa and the GGWSSI, it yielded few operational results. Under the PCC, as for other thematic partnerships, few of the goals of the first Action Plan were attained (Sicurelli, 2013). In 2011, the 12th meeting of the AU-EU Joint Task Force called upon the Joint Expert Groups (JEGs) of the thematic partnerships to '*deliver concrete outcomes*'.[63]

61 Thomas Sankara, the then Head of State of Burkina Faso, first proposed the GGWSSI in the 1980s to stop the spreading of the Sahara. This idea was voiced again about 20 years later by the then President of Nigeria, Olusegun Obasanjo, who brought it forward to the African Union (AU) in 2005 at a summit of the Community of Sahel-Saharan States. AU HSG endorsed the GGWSSI as a pan-African programme in 2007. The UN endorsed it in 2011 (pers. comm. with an AUC officer, June 2014). For more information on the status of the GGWSSI, see: http://global-mechanism.org/news-events/events/forging-innovative-partnerships-for-the-implementation-of-the-great-green-wall.

62 http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-13-367_en.htm.

63 https://europafrica.files.wordpress.com/2011/04/joint-task-force-meeting-april-2011.pdf, page 1.

The climate change partnership seemed to be in a stalemate until the 2014 EU-Africa Summit. In the Ministerial Statement on Climate Change issued in the margin of the Summit, the two partners expressed their determination to adopt a legally binding UNFCCC agreement in 2015 and highlighted the urgent need to fund Africa's adaptation gap (EC, 2014). The declaration of the Summit recognised climate change as a threat to peace and security and stated the EU's intention to '*continue to support African countries in the preparation of national and regional climate-resilient and low-emission development strategies*' (General Secretariat of the Council, 2014a).

At the 2014 EU-Africa Summit, the JAES was reduced to five priority areas, replacing the eight thematic partnerships. In the roadmap for the period 2014-17, climate change and other environmental issues are included among the priority area 'Global and Emerging Issues'. Climate change is also briefly mentioned under the priority area 'Human Development' (General Secretariat of the Council, 2014b). **The activities under the climate change theme are more or less the same and as numerous as under the PCC.** The fight against land degradation and desertification and the preservation of ecosystems are the main intervention areas (which essentially comprise adaptation measures under various continental and regional initiatives, including the GGWSSI, TerrAfrica, GCCA, the Africa Regional Strategy for Disaster Risk Reduction, the Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade initiative, REDD+ and other conservation initiatives). This roadmap puts more emphasis than before on African Earth observation capabilities (to support food security, health and natural resources management policies). Funding for ClimDev-Africa and GGWSSI will continue through the Pan-African Programme 2014-17 (European Commission, 2014b). The transition to low-carbon and natural resources-efficient growth paths also features on the roadmap.

3.3. Weaknesses of the JAES and implications for the political dialogue and cooperation on climate change

Since the beginning, the JAES has struggled in achieving its objectives. Many of the reasons that explain its shortcomings have also hampered the climate change partnership.

The JAES has been criticised for having had too cumbersome an institutional structure and its deliberations and decision-making processes for having imposed excessive transaction costs on their participants. The biannual AU-EU Joint Task Force meetings and other meetings were too bureaucratic and contributed little to the advancement of the agenda, although stakeholders in certain partnerships accommodated themselves to those constraints (Helly *et al.,* 2014). This structure certainly handicapped African partners, which had less capacity and resources than EU actors. This might have negatively affected the stakeholders' willingness to engage in the dialogues, with some member states, African RECs and non-state actors having sometimes missed meetings, as a EU official reported.

The weak capacity of the Joint Expert Groups (JEGs) to make decisions reportedly constituted another hindrance to implementation of the JAES. Weak linkages between these technical structures and both decision-making and implementing bodies as well as their ambiguous roles are among the reasons for this poor track record (Bossuyt and Sherriff, 2010). A recent paper by CONCORD (2013) explained that '*the JAES provides a framework within which many initiatives are already undertaken in other joint structures*'. This means that the implementation of the climate change partnership was dependent upon other institutions (including UN organisations) and other donors than the EU. The performance of the JEGs has also suffered from a lack of participation of African member states. The lack of involvement of non-state actors in the dialogue may have also affected the effectiveness of the PCC (CONCORD, 2013).

The JAES, including the climate change thematic area, has not received sufficient political support on both the African and European sides. Neither has it given rise to sufficient ownership at different levels (national governments, regional and continental institutions, and non-institutional actors). African partners have been criticised for investing too little political leadership and technical capacity into the JAES, in particular at AUC level (Helly *et al*., 2014). The general view held by European observers is that '*a lot depends on African [partners'] capacity*'. A EC officer close to the climate negotiations said: '*AU member states have been resistant at certain points, with political differences among African states, and with the African Union having limited their capacity to build the Africa group.*' The AUC, on the other hand, did not have the mandate and lacked the capacity to harmonise the views on climate change issues of African actors, including those involved in the JAES, AMCEN and CAHOSCC. Their fragmentation has made them unable to give life to the JAES' political character. The same EC officer also wondered: ' *[…] If Africans lose faith in the abilities of the AUC, then who will play the leadership role?*'

On the EU side, complaints have been voiced about the '*lack of preparation and political will of African governments and regional organisations as a crucial impediment for the implementation of the partnership*'. '*The preparation* [of the 2008 Joint Africa-EU Declaration on Climate Change] *was chaotic*', an EC officer familiar with the JAES climate talks explained. The EU essentially drove the drafting of the document given that at the time there was nearly no capacity on the AU side. '*[…] As a consequence, the JAES has remained a "paper strategy" that lacks political traction*'. Due to these shortcomings, EU member states became less involved in the partnership over time. '*On the outset, there were six active [EU] member states: France, Germany, the UK, Portugal, Spain and the Netherlands. But the dynamics are slowly fading away*', an EC officer close to the climate change partnership said.[64]

On both sides, scepticism about the other side's willingness to cooperate, and perhaps even mutual distrust, was another unfavourable development for the climate change partnership. The impression that the EU has continued to act as '*a paternalistic actor, unable to consider the AU and its members as equal partners*' is common among African parties. '*The EU [has been] also perceived to firmly keep control over the agenda setting, the substance and the process of consultations and meetings*', an interviewee from DG CLIMA explained. This problem (the EU imposing its agenda to African stakeholders) is found across the JAES partnerships. African partners have perceived Europe as having double standards and behaving incoherently, following realpolitik when it comes to security and economic concerns, and professing values (human rights, democracy and good governance) when its critical interests are not at stake.

External factors may have also diminished the effectiveness of the JAES. **The JAES has had to compete for political support with other partnerships involving EU and African parties**, notably the Cotonou Partnership Agreement[65] and the European Neighbourhood Policy. This is especially true in the area of climate change where many international forums provide opportunities for political dialogue.

[64] Germany however more than other member states, is willing to lead on climate change, as Angela Merkel expressed during the recent EU-Africa Summit in April 2014. The Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) is aiming to receive funding for climate change from the soon-to-be-agreed Pan-African Programme (PanAf) for the JAES. Pers. comm. with EC officer from DG DEVCO, EC, Brussels, February 2014.

[65] In the 2006 Joint ACP-EU Declaration on Climate Change and Development, the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States and the EU stated their willingness to regularly hold consultations in preparation of UNFCCC meetings and support ACP Parties' participation in the negotiations. In this declaration they also committed to better integrate climate change concerns into ACP development and poverty reduction strategies and into European development cooperation policies (ACP-EC, 2006).

Yet, the activities of the climate change partnership have successfully mobilised financial resources. **If it failed to fulfil expectations, a lack of funding was probably not the main culprit.** EU institutions disbursed sizeable funds through the EDF and other financial instruments and the GCCA. EU member states, AU member states, multilateral climate finance instruments and the private sector also made financial contributions. ClimDev-Africa and the GGWSSI received adequate funding. The EU has also fulfilled its financial commitments for the climate change partnership with Fast-Start Finance delivered to African actors in line with the request of the Africa Group at the Copenhagen COP (Sicurelli, 2013). The largest share of funds from EU institutions and EU member states has been allocated to capacity building and institutional strengthening for the AUC and affiliated bodies (55 million euros in 2007-11 for institutional support for the AU).[66] **However, this funding approach might have given rise to another problem:** as an EC officer close to the JAES negotiations explained, '*basically, 98% of the AU programme budget is funded by external donors, which explains the lack of African political traction [mentioned above]*'.

4. Directions for a strengthened Africa-Europe partnership on climate change

Despite the meagre record of the JAES climate change partnership, the gap between Africa and the EU's stances on climate change has narrowed, all things considered. A rapprochement between them has taken place in the multilateral negotiations on various issues. The EU has been increasingly supportive of making adaptation a central element of the future climate agreement, a point that the Africa Group has vehemently upheld for a long time (the EU's position on this matter remarkably evolved at the 2011 COP, which took place on African soil). African Parties have shown a growing willingness to contribute to mitigation proportionally to their means and responsibilities, with the involvement of emerging economies and not just industrialised countries.

Some divergences between African and EU positions have persisted. The Africa Group and the EU still disagree on various climate finance matters, for instance, when African Parties, along with other developing countries, requested a roadmap for climate finance for the pre-2020 period, which the EU refused. Within the Africa Group, some like South Africa opposes legally binding emissions targets for emerging countries. Such disagreements are stark reminders that African and EU interests concerning climate policy only partially overlap.

This analysis does not necessarily aim to find a common position between the Africa Group and the EU at COP21—that task is left to their bilateral dialogues and the multilateral negotiations, but to see **in which areas and how they could collaboratively contribute to an ambitious agreement in Paris in 2015 and to the effective implementation of their respective commitments in the post-2015 period**. According to the ministerial declaration of the 2014 EU-Africa Summit, African and EU leaders still aim to seek common positions in the multilateral negotiations. **Through a sustained dialogue and joint initiatives their contributions could take various forms**, as discussed in detail in this final section.

[66] http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/african_union/eu_african_union/development_cooperation/index_en.htm.

4.1. Revisiting the rationale of an Africa-EU dialogue on climate change

Given the criticisms addressed to the partnership on climate change JAES, it is important to reflect on the value added of this type of framework. The main objective of the PCC was to tackle climate change through a continent-to-continent dialogue and cooperation in the context of a multilateral framework. Eventually it lacked substance and remained little more than a collection of development interventions. Besides the functional issues of the JAES, this partnership may have failed to identify the right issues at the continental level and involve the right actors.

The Africa-EU dialogue could help to elaborate an **African climate policy framework providing guidance (governance principles, common priorities, and accountability mechanisms) to African countries and RECs for their climate policy processes**, supporting local initiatives in the context of the multilateral policy framework, ensuring that climate policies are coherent with policies in other sectors, and strengthening their "readiness" for climate finance instruments such as the GCF and those of European bilateral donors. Such a framework would take into account intra-regional and continental linkages in vulnerabilities and responses to climate change, for example, for the management of trans-boundary forestry and water resources. There are several continental policy frameworks in Africa, including the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), African Governance Architecture, the Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa (PIDA)[67], and the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP). Recent initiatives suggest that continental institutions are useful in providing guidance and support to African RECs' and countries' climate-related policy processes, notably the NEPAD Environment Action Plan and the NEPAD Climate Change Fund, which provides technical and financial assistance to AU member states and RECs for adaptation in the agricultural sector[68] and for environmental conservation (this fund is supported by the German development assistance). The experience of the EU with its supranational climate and energy policy could provide useful for that purpose as the a value added of the JAES lies in the sharing of experience and expertise (Helly *et al*., 2014).

For EU institutions and member states, the JAES can provide a platform for information sharing and coordination. Experience has shown that coordination among EU actors regarding climate finance, for example, is a challenge. The dialogue under the JAES could serve to harmonise their positions and commitments for their climate-related development assistance and non-ODA climate finance towards African Parties, which could serve as a building block for their overall commitments at the UNFCCC. It could contribute to the transparency of climate finance by overseeing a reporting mechanism for African and European partners. In the short term it would be useful to track resources funding capacity building activities for African climate policymaking structures and negotiators.[69]

On the EU side, the EC, EU member states, and various instruments certainly have roles to play in different and complementary ways. For example, EU institutions and member states may have to play complementary roles in supporting the private sector in the development and the transfer of low-carbon technologies. **The JAES could facilitate the definition of complementary roles. It could also support a sound dialogue on the coherence of policies in the EU and Africa with climate change adaptation**

[67] PIDA supports the development of regional and continental infrastructures (transport, energy, ICTs, and transnational water resources) (http://www.afdb.org/en/topics-and-sectors/initiatives-partnerships/programme-for-infrastructure-development-in-africa-pida/).

[68] It has been increasingly recognised that national and regional agricultural development strategies should integrate climate change adaptation measures. An initiative led by the NEPAD Planning and Coordinating Agency and the Department of Rural Economy and Agriculture of the AU Commission and supported by the German cooperation is currently supporting CAADP lead institutions to strengthen CAADP at different levels to encourage adaptation to climate change in the agricultural sector (AU-NEPAD Agriculture Climate Change Adaptation-Mitigation Framework).

[69] Pers. comm. with an officer of the Embassy of France in Ethiopia (February 2014).

and mitigation objectives (and general development objectives in the context of climate change), especially with regards to the most vulnerable parts of Africa.[70] In various domestic and external policy areas, through linkages in global consumer and capital goods (agricultural, forestry, energy and industrial) and services (transport), international investments, and science and technology diffusion, the EU can promote low-carbon economic growth and resiliency to climate change in Africa. This dialogue could provide a better understanding of trade-offs among policy areas and identify synergies in favour of adaptation and mitigation objectives.

A better-defined agenda for the Africa-EU dialogue on climate change will have to be complemented by enhanced institutional mechanisms. As an AU interviewee stressed, '*for the JAES to maintain its existence, a review of the institutional mechanism is key*.' It has been reported that the JAES' mechanisms could be made simpler, less time consuming (with less meetings), focused on more specific issues, more result-oriented and promoting greater engagement on both sides (policymakers, experts or non-state actors). Actually, since the 2014 Summit, the institutional mechanisms of the EU-Africa partnership have been adjusted so as to perform better. Instead of biannual Joint Task Force meetings, stakeholders now meet at annual meetings (Joint Annual Forums) during which discussions focus on specific topics.[71]

For the JAES to facilitate the harmonisation of African and European Parties' positions in the UNFCCC negotiations, the stakeholders of the JAES dialogue on climate change will not only have to deepen technical discussions, but they will also have to adopt a more political approach. As Helly *et al*. (2014) explained '*options for the rationalisation of the existing technical organisation can certainly be envisaged […], but they will by no means suffice to overcome deeper political challenges and dilemmas remaining in Africa-Europe relations.*' Linkages between consultative bodies and African and European decision-making structures will have to be improved (Helly *et al*., 2014). The regular interaction between DG Climate Action and AMCEN (for example, the Gaborone Declaration, AMCEN, 2013) and the diplomatic work by the EU Delegation to the AU in Addis Ababa could play a more critical role in the JAES. Officially the JAES has given a central role to the AUC, but the role of the latter regarding climate change is not as important as that of AMCEN (whose Secretariat is hosted at UNEP). This partly explains the capacity issue of the African side in the JAES climate change area (see Section 3.3). A EU official also explained that the JAES should be promoted to AU and EU member states delegates at the UN offices in New York and Bonn, where multilateral negotiations take place. The JAES should also ensure that CSOs and the private sector are involved in the dialogue on climate change using the funding opportunities provided by the PanAf, to level the "playing field" and foster their contributions to the implementation of interventions in this thematic area.

4.2. Promoting a common notion of equity

According to the Africa-EU ministerial statement on climate change (April, 2014), African and European Parties agreed that, given the binding target for the global temperature increase of 2°C, *all Parties* should contribute to mitigating climate change, on the basis of equity. They also acknowledged that, for developing countries, economic and social development is a priority over mitigation, and that adaptation to climate change and low-carbon economic growth are necessary for sustainable development (European Commission, 2014b). This seemingly **reflects the consensus that a rigid interpretation of the CBDR**

[70] Policy coherence for development refers to the absence of contradiction between developed countries' policies in various areas and their global development objectives as well as to the presence of synergies among their policies that are conducive to development in developing countries and globally.

[71] Pers. comm. with a EU official taking part in the JAES (February 2014).

principle, on the basis of the North-South distinction, is no longer an appropriate approach, at least in the eyes of the Africa Group and the EU. After all, China recently became the largest emitter of GHG (on a per-capita basis), but it is still treated as a "developing country" within the UNFCCC (den Elzen *et al.*, 2013). Emissions in Europe and the US are trending down and rapid growth in emerging economies is pushing up energy demand, which will globally continue to grow rapidly in the coming decades (World Energy Council, 2013). In emerging and developing countries, GHG emissions are forecast to grow by 150% between 2010 and 2100 (MIT, 2013).

In Warsaw, the EU (as well as the US) already clearly expressed that the climate policy regime should evolve towards a more nuanced and broader sharing of responsibilities. The **EU supports the application of the principle of CBDR in a "dynamic way"** that is operational at the level of individual mitigation commitments: Parties with most responsibilities and capabilities should carry out absolute emission reduction actions, while other countries with limited responsibilities and capabilities should provide other types of commitments. The EU's position is also that emerging economies should make contributions, according to their responsibilities and capacities, and also that the contributions of developed countries should be differentiated (the US, that is emitting a lot more GHG than Europeans, should bear a bigger burden, according to EU officials). (Freyling *et al.*, 2014; European Parliament, 2014). The EU (but also South Africa!) advocates a common accounting system[72] for all countries that provides flexibility to accommodate national circumstances and capabilities (European Parliament, 2014).

Africa's common position is to ensure the survival of the CBDR principle. The Africa Group (together with the LMDCs and China) is in favour of a differentiated approach between developed and developing countries' mitigation pledges. The Africa Group proposed that commitments of countries should be assessed thoroughly, based on indicators of equity and fairness, oriented towards a global carbon budget (AMCEN, 2013). It has put forward the adoption of a "principle-based reference framework" or an "equity reference framework" (Ngwadla and Rajamani, 2014). There are other proposals that have been made under the Climate Action Framework (CAN). CAN, along with a some Parties (including Kenya, Gambia and South Africa), has been advocating for a formal process to elaborate an "equity reference framework" that translates the equity notion into a practical tool, based on indicators, to determine and assess mitigation and climate finance commitments consistent with the temperature increase goals for the 2015 agreement (CAN, 2013). The EU is in favour of such approach. Although the likelihood that an equity reference framework will be agreed upon by COP21 is low, a sufficiently precise framework could guide the preparation of INDCs. South Africa however, as part of the BASIC group, has been considered a misfit in the African equity debate: it is in favour of a "multi-criteria approach", based on historical emissions as well as human development and respective capacities. It has been criticised by African civil society for breaking the continental unity in favour of the continuation of CBDR (Pauw *et al.*, 2014).

The interpretation of the notion of equity and the CBDR principles is a key missing piece of the current negotiations, although the Lima Call for Action emphasises the need for a "multilateral rules-based regime" under the Convention. It is also said that *'all Parties [should] strive to achieve low greenhouse gas climate-resilient economies and societies, on the basis of equity and in accordance with their […] common but differentiated responsibilities'* (UNFCCC, 2014b: page 7). African and EU stakeholders can foster further reflection on the equity principle and on how to put it into practice, more specifically in taking a multi-dimensional approach to equity. A **policy dialogue could convene African and European stakeholders in the coming months, bringing together negotiators, policymakers, experts and civil society**

[72] On accounting rules to track progress with commitments for all countries and to what extent the Annex I-Annex II divide will prevent such common accounting rules for all countries. Annex I Parties are industrialised countries, part of the OECD, plus countries with economies in transition. Annex II Parties consist of OECD members of Annex I, but not the EIT Parties (See: http://unfccc.int/parties_and_observers/items/2704.php).

representatives to share views and jointly elaborate a practical concept of equity in the context of the climate negotiations. It is crucial that the concept of equity considers the multiple elements of the UNFCCC process, including mitigation, finance, adaptation, loss and damage, capacity building, technology, transparency and accountability. It can also consider how much and what type of action each Party should take, based on emission patterns, vulnerability, and so forth. In addition, this approach to equity should consider a timetable for countries' commitments (Morgan *et al.*, 2014). This would be a useful step in the preparation and review of Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs), discussed further in 4.3.

4.3. Cooperating for adaptation and mitigation

Globally, GHG emissions abatement commitments for both the pre-2020 and post-2020 periods have to be more ambitious than they currently are to prevent temperatures from rising by more than 2°C.[73] The EU's pre-2020 commitments are more or less consistent with a path towards that target. Taking into account the EU's post-2020 commitments, the Africa Group agreed that the EU's approach is consistent with the efforts it expects from developed countries (at least a 30% reduction in GHG emissions by 2030)[74]. Commitments of other developed countries and emerging economies, however, are inadequate. **The Africa and EU blocs could join forces to advocate and negotiate for higher mitigation commitments from other Parties.**

The EU (like other developed countries) is in favour of further differentiation of responsibilities among Parties so as to foster emerging economies' mitigation efforts. The position of the AGN on differentiation is less clear. **Within the Africa Group, some Parties belong to coalitions holding divergent views from those of the EU and other developed countries**. One such country is South Africa, which is also part of the BASIC group: it is opposed to the notion of legally binding GHG emissions abatement commitments by emerging and developing countries. Instead, like other Parties, South Africa favours an agreement with voluntary emissions reduction pledges (Chevallier, 2010). Contributions, even modest, by some African countries that are significant emitters would help align the African and European agendas and would send an encouraging signal to all the Parties.

A recent report of the European Parliament issued before the Lima COP noted that '*the Africa Group has proposed an assessment based on a principle-based reference framework to consider the adequacy of the proposed contributions in terms of ambition, equity and fairness. This represents the most structured and detailed process proposed. […] [Such an assessment process] would continue until 2016 while the structure and rules of the agreement will be adopted in December 2015 in Paris. If agreed, Parties would need to be given some time to develop their final quantified commitments until the end of 2016*'. (European Parliament, 2014: page 19). **Given the apparent willingness of both sides to formalise a framework for mitigation commitments that goes beyond the developed-versus-developing countries mind set, the Africa-EU dialogue could yield balanced contributions to the debate on differentiation in mitigation commitments in the post-2020 climate regime.**[75]

[73] Limiting global warming to 2°C would require a rapid decrease in the growth in emissions and then a steady decline, down to zero net emissions around 2050. To attain this objective, major GHG emitters would have to cut their emissions by more than 50 per cent by 2020 (Flannery, 2014), which many of them currently are not willing to do.

[74] http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2014/jul/23/eu-agrees-to-improve-energy-efficiency-30-by-2030; see also AMCEN, 2013.

[75] This discussion may include Monitoring, Reporting and Verification requirements, which could be differentiated so as to lower the burden for developing countries with lesser capabilities and having low emissions (Haites, Yamin and Hohne, 2013).

This dialogue could as well take into account requests from development and emerging countries to receive assistance for the formulation and implementation of INDCs, and more generally for the transition to low-carbon growth paths. As South African negotiators proposed before the 2014 Lima COP, UNFCCC commitments should include financial and technical support to developing countries for the development and implementation of the INDCs. South Africa also made a submission to the UNFCCC outlining guidelines for INDCs that capture this other dimension of mitigation (UNFCCC, 2014c). The JAES framework, which encompasses various mitigation tools (REDD+ and other conservation policy instruments that can safeguard carbon sinks on the African continent), is well positioned to make progress in these areas. For this purpose, the JAES should offer synergies with other thematic areas of the Africa-EU partnership, including the energy partnership[76] and the science, technology and innovation thematic area.

For the pre-2020 period, as the Africa Group is in favour of keeping the Kyoto Protocol alive (Africa is only responsible for less than 4% of global GHG emissions)[77], **the two blocs could intensify their advocacy efforts for the ratification of the Doha Amendment to the KP and the clarification of GHG emissions accounting rules before or soon after COP21 (See Annex 1)**.

Adaptation traditionally has received less attention than mitigation in the UN climate negotiations. In recent years, however, this issue has climbed up the agenda, although imbalances have remained. The AU Assembly, in its Decision on the High-Level Work Programme on Climate Change Action in Africa and Preparations for the Global Climate Change Events in 2014, reaffirmed that *'adaptation is a priority in all actions on climate change in Africa'* (African Union, 2014). The recent EU Council Conclusions stated that *'adaptation must be a central part of a balanced agreement […]'* (Council of the European Union, 2014). However, the head of the Sudanese delegation on behalf of the AGN at the Lima COP stated that *'We are of view that any assessment should include the assessment of means of implementation, particularly of adaptation support,'*[78] which may suggest a stronger emphasis on adaptation finance by African counterparts, compared to the slightly vague expression of the EU Parties.

The **question of whether commitments towards adaptation interventions and climate finance should be part of the INDCS has been divisive between the Africa Group and the EU**. At the June 2014 UNFCCC meetings in Bonn, where this question was debated, the G77 expressed concerns about the lack of funds made available for the process of National Adaptation Plans (NAPs). The Africa Group emphasised that global financial contributions for adaptation should be clearly specified in the new climate agreement and that INDCs should include financial and technical assistance for adaptation. Some African countries again voiced their concerns that adaptation and climate were not given adequate weight in the UNFCCC Non-paper on Elements for a Draft Negotiating Text.[79] To promote adaptation in the current negotiations, the Africa Group made a proposal in 2014 to assess adaptation costs at the global level,the so-called Global Goal for Adaptation (UNFCCC, 2014c), which would depend on the expected global temperature change (and hence, on mitigation efforts). This approach received support from various Parties, including the G77 and the EU. At the Lima COP, Parties eventually agreed that countries can decide on whether to include adaptation in their INDCs.[80]

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76 In 2010, Africa and the EU established the Africa-EU Energy Partnership with the objective to foster investment in low-carbon energy technologies and improve access to energy in Africa. This partnership has led to the emergence of a number of programmes, notably the Africa-EU Renewable Energy Cooperation Programme (RECP), which has supported countries and RECs in developing renewable energy markets. The EU delivered Fast-Start Finance for the RECP (see http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-10-407_en.htm?locale=en).

77 http://www.nepad.org/climatechangeandsustainabledevelopment/news/2576/cahoscc-%E2%80%9Cafrica-should-speak-one-voice-articulating (See Section 1).

78 http://www4.unfccc.int/submissions/Lists/OSPSubmissionUpload/39_102_130620113200763865-African%20Group_statement.pdf.

79 Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action, 2014. .

80 https://unfccc.int/files/meetings/lima_dec_2014/application/pdf/auv_cop20_lima_call_for_climate_action.pdf.

The experience of the JAES in dealing with adaptation could be a useful asset to inform the dialogue on adaptation planning and needs assessment at the UNFCCC, especially as the AGN and European negotiators have been playing key roles in these discussions. Additionally, **the JAES could draw lessons from the National Adaptation Plans (NAPs) process in specific African countries** and analyse the factors that can make it work or fail, especially in the context of regional initiatives and frameworks that the JAES has been supporting (GGWSSI, Clim-Dev Africa, TerrAfrica and the African Regional Strategy for Disaster Risk Reduction) or in relation to other African policy frameworks such as CAADP and platforms supporting resilience (the Global Alliance for Resilience (AGIR) in West Africa and the Supporting the Horn of Africa's Resilience (SHARE) in Eastern Africa in particular).

4.4. Financing the fight against climate change

Financing low-carbon and climate-resilient development has been a key sticking point of the UNFCCC debates. An important reason for that is the **lack of a universal understanding of the "fair sharing of the financial burden"** (See 4.2).[81] Budget flows from the EU are however increasingly targeting climate change: for instance, 20 % of EU budget will be dedicated to climate change during the period 2014-2020.[82] Yet, Africans criticise the EU for being *'oblivious to their development priorities: to provide growth and energy for all'* and strong doubts about the EU's commitment in the coming years have been expressed.[83] Until this day, the EU has allocated more climate finance on mitigation, to the detriment of adaptation (See 2.2.2). Emerging economies have also attracted more climate finance than LDCs: since 2003, over one quarter of all climate finance directed to Sub-Saharan Africa went to South Africa most notably for energy projects (Barnard *et al.*, 2014).

The **EU states that public sector climate finance will continue to play a key role in mobilising resources after 2020, but it also recognises the importance of the private sector** (European Commission, 2015b). Private sector investments are increasingly holding a strong potential in mobilising capital finance for climate change (so-called "innovative financing"). Yet, there are concerns that governments may be shifting their legal and/or moral responsibility on climate finance to the private sector.[84] The private sector may also invest more in mitigation than in adaptation, since the latter does not offer an immediate financial return (Knaepen, 2014).

Hence, **there is a need for finding a burden-sharing mechanism accepted as fair by everyone**.[85] In section 4.1, it was explained that the majority of funding for the JAES was provided by EU institutions and EU member states, despite the JAES carrying the label of an 'equal partnership'. It is a challenge to improve co-financing that will ensure equal standing in the partnership. The PanAf, the JAES' new financial instrument, does not ensure ownership on the African side as it is a unilateral instrument of an EU institution. Therefore, co-financing with participation from the African side, to follow the spirit of the partnership, is needed (Helly *et al.*, 2014). The JAES' Multiannual Indicative Programme (MIP) for the period 2014-2017 states that the PanAf will contribute to the 20% climate finance target of the

81 Generally climate finance refers to capital flows that cover the costs of transitioning to a low-carbon global economy and/or adaptation and resilience to current and future climate change impacts. The High Level Advisory Group on Climate Change Finance has identified the following potential sources: 1) public sources for grants or loans; 2) development bank-type instruments; 3) carbon market finance; 4) private capital (UN, 2010).

82 http://europa.eu/newsroom/highlights/special-coverage/multiannual-financial-framework-2014-2020/index_en.htm. .

83 http://europesworld.org/2014/03/21/how-can-europe-revive-its-leadership-role-in-the-fight-against-climate-change/#.VPQsFbPF-Hw.

84 http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2015/jan/20/eu-to-launch-diplomatic-offensive-ahead-paris-climate-talks.

85 http://europesworld.org/2014/03/21/how-can-europe-revive-its-leadership-role-in-the-fight-against-climate-change/#.U_GHJbySyKx.

Development Cooperation Instrument, but this will essentially be done by means of EU funding (European Commission, 2014c).[86]

The EU and its member states have been criticised for the lack of transparency and accountability of climate finance they provide. In response to problem in 2013 the EC established a 'monitoring mechanism' that requires member states to annually report on the financial and technological support provided to developing countries, in accordance with UNFCCC provisions. This monitoring mechanism has not been fully implemented yet.[87] The effectiveness of EU climate finance will depend on whether member states can cooperate in overcoming these institutional and administrative challenges.

A good starting point to overcome transparency issues would be to map and provide an account of what has already been done by developed countries, looking at the impacts of the interventions carried out, and assess needs and remaining gaps. The Africa Group recently urged the UNFCCC to complete the second review of the AF before the Lima COP20. In addition, an agreed-upon multilateral definition of "climate finance" would encourage more consistent reporting and facilitate better analysis of the overarching landscape (Climate Policy Initiative, 2014). The EU and Africa can take the lead on that.

Furthermore, **African countries lack the capacity to adhere to, access and absorb climate funds ("climate finance readiness").** On AU-level, there is also a lack of coordination between the key bodies that inform the African Common Position (that is, the AGN and AMCEN) and as such there is great scope to support the AGN by for example, providing dedicated Secretariat support especially for information storage/archival services and support to the Chair for stakeholder coordination.[88] Furthermore, support from continental bodies and development partners to the capacity of African negotiators is often fragmented with erratic and specific capacity development in accordance with themes (often donor-identified themes and not AGN-identified capacity gaps). A recommendation in this regard would be to develop a **capacity development strategy for the AGN and take a systematic approach to mobilising resources from African governments and donors to execute such strategy**. This could also support better coordination among development partners for support to the AGN.

On a more general note, some of the climate finance should be used to increase administrative and institutional capacities for policy implementation. Application of the principles of aid effectiveness will also help to overcome administrative absorption capacity constraints. Positively, the **need for support for "readiness" for climate finance has gained increasing attention in international efforts to deliver climate finance to developing countries** in this context.[89] The GCF will provide support for readiness activities (for example, resources for the preparation or strengthening of low-emission development strategies and plans). Development banks play an increasingly important role in this regard: recently, the AfDB launched a its Africa Climate Change Fund that aims at ensuring that African countries can build capacity to apply for funds from the GCF.[90]

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86 Financing for the GGWSSI and ClimDev-Africa will continue during the period 2014-2017.

87 European Commission and Lithuanian Presidency of the Council of the EU, 2013.

88 Currently, the AGN has support from the Climate and Development Knowledge Network (CDKN) that helps to provide dedicated capacity to the AGN to ensure its participation in the UNFCCC process is effective and informed by adequate preparation. However, as indicated by the previous Chair for the Warsaw Cop 19, there are still major gaps to support the AGN to participate fully at negotiations and the numerous key meetings around the year in build-up to COP.

89 Some EU member states are investing in strengthening capacity-building. For example, the German development agency is implementing a project to develop integrated MRV systems for REDD+ in the SADC region. For more details, see: Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ). 2014. http://www.giz.de/en/worldwide/15908.html.

90 http://www.afdb.org/en/news-and-events/article/afdbs-new-fund-paves-the-way-for-climate-finance-readiness-in-africa-africa-climate-change-fund-annual-report-14227/.

4.5. Upcoming opportunities for joint engagements on the road to COP21 and beyond

This year offers an opportunity that cannot be missed for world's leaders to organise efficient global collective action to protect global public goods (ETTG, 2014). Three very important international policy processes will come to fruition in 2015. First, in July, high-level political representatives will gather in Addis Ababa for the third UN International Conference on Financing for Development; the outcome of inter-governmental negotiations will support the implementation of the post-2015 agenda. In September, the international community will endorse the Sustainable Development Goals, which will frame international relations, beyond the foreign aid axis and the Millennium Development Goals. And lastly, in December, all nations, including the largest emitters, will meet in Paris to attempt to seal a universal, comprehensive and legally binding agreement on climate change.

Before the UN conference on climate change at the end of the year, JAES stakeholders should take into account the following events: the Sixth Petersburg dialogue[91], held in Berlin from 17 until 19 May; the Bonn Climate Change Conference (UNFCCC) from 1-15 June[92], the third session of the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action (ADP) from 31 August to 4 September in Bonn, a hands-on training workshop for the Africa region on vulnerability and adaptation assessment from 28 September until 2 October the Addis Sustainable Development Summit in October (dates to be determined), with a special focus on "Africa's Road to Paris". After COP21, to be held from 30 November until 11 December, key events will be the Adaptation Futures 2016: Practices and Solutions to be held in May 2016 in Rotterdam and COP22 to be held from 7 until 18 November 2016 in Marrakech.

Further EU-Africa discussions on climate change should be pursued before and after COP21, with a greater involvement of AU member states, RECs as well as African and European non-state actors. On April 22, 2014, a College-to-College meeting between the EC and the AUC took place in Brussels, which was the most important JAES event of 2014. Both Parties stated that they would strengthen their dialogue on climate change and re-emphasised that the 2015 Paris Agreement should be legally-binding and ambitious. The EU again offered its support to the preparation of the INDCs among African Parties. [93] An open and deeper dialogue on how to translate equity and differentiation in the prospective climate agreement is an option to contribute to the preparation of COP21. The coming months are crucial for the planning of the PanAf, which is part of the EDF, to fund the JAES. Further dialogue about the aims of the climate change component of the JAES is required to ensure that funding from this instrument will be used effectively to advance a joint, result-oriented Africa-EU climate change agenda. Beyond these short-term objectives, adequate preparation should be made for the 2017 EU-Africa Summit, when at that point the imperative will have hopefully shifted to the implementation of the commitments made in Paris in 2015.

[91] http://climate-l.iisd.org/events/sixth-petersberg-climate-dialogue/.
[92] http://unfccc.int/meetings/unfccc_calendar/items/2655.php.
[93] http://www.africa-eu-partnership.org/sites/default/files/documents/declaration_en.pdf.

Figure 3: Major policy events in the run-up to the UN Climate Change Conference in Paris (COP21)



Annex 1: Key UNFCCC Agreements (1997-2014)

The **Kyoto Protocol** (KP): adopted in 1997 and came into effect in 2005. The first commitment period was 2008–2012.[94] Under the KP, commitments by developed countries were legally binding and they assumed almost all of the reduction in global emissions. Various mechanisms were put in place to facilitate GHG emissions abatement, including **"market mechanisms"**[95] in particular, a **compliance mechanism.**

The **Copenhagen Accord** (2009): this was formulated, as a face saver, by a small group of developed and developing countries, given that not all developing countries were willing to enter legally binding emissions abatement commitments under the KP regime. The Accord fixed a binding target for the increase in global temperature and set broad climate finance goals. This political agreement led to voluntary emissions abatement pledges for the pre-2020 period by a majority of the Parties and to a collective pledge by developed countries to mobilise US$100bn of new financial assistance per year by 2020.[96]

The **Cancun Agreements** (2010)**:** set a binding target of 2°C increase in global average temperature relative to its pre-industrial level. The Cancun Agreements encouraged developing countries to formulate voluntary Low-Carbon Development Strategies by 2020 and to plan **Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions** (NAMAs). The Agreements elevated adaptation to the same priority level as mitigation and led to the creation of the **Cancun Adaptation Framework**.[97]

The **Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action** (ADP): the 2011 Durban COP launched the process to negotiate an international agreement for the post-2020 period intended to succeed to the KP, which led to the establishment of the ADP to manage the negotiations.[98] The vaguely defined notion of 'contribution' to mitigation, instead of 'commitment to a GHG emissions target', emerged as a way to move beyond the then prevailing dichotomy between developed and developing country in the interpretation of the CBDR principle.[99]

The **Doha Amendment to the Kyoto Protocol**: adopted at the COP in Doha (2012), extended the KP to the period 2013–20.[100] To date, only a few Parties have ratified the Doha Amendment and the KP has been in limbo since the expiration of the first commitment period.[101]

The **Lima Call for Climate Action**: this was, along with a draft of the post-2015 Agreement, the key deliverable of COP20 held in Lima in December 2014. Both documents were only the basis for reaching an agreement at COP21. Many options were still on the table, which left contentious issues unresolved. For instance, the Warsaw International Mechanism on Loss and Damage did not come forward strongly in the draft text, which has been a concern for developing countries (UNFCCC, 2014b).

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[94] On average, emission reductions agreed upon under the KP amounted to five per cent of the 1990 levels of GHG emissions. These targets had to be achieved by 2012. The United States (US) did not sign the KP and Canada, despite having ratified the KP, never implemented it.

[95] Although the Parties to the KP must fulfil their commitments 'primarily' domestically, the Protocol established market mechanisms (also called 'Kyoto Mechanisms') enabling them to trade emission abatements. For example, the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) enabled developed countries to finance emissions reduction projects in developing countries and obtain emission allowances in return. The 2006 Nairobi Framework provided a tool to facilitate the participation to the CDM of developing countries, particularly Sub-Saharan Africa. Although CDM projects in Africa have multiplied since then, they still represent a very small share (less than 3 per cent) of all CDM projects.

[96] http://unfccc.int/meetings/copenhagen_dec_2009/items/5262.php.

[97] http://cancun.unfccc.int/.

[98] The political intent and legal provisions underpinning the ADP excluded the use of the Annex I - non-Annex I categorisation in the post-2020 agreement.

[99] http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2011/cop17/eng/l10.pdf.

[100] In the second period, Parties committed to reduce their emissions by at least 18 per cent below their 1990 levels by 2020, with a revised list of GHG taken into account to tally emissions.

[101] http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/doha_amendment/items/7362.php.

Annex 2: Key documents on climate change in Africa-EU relations

- **2000**, **Cotonou Agreement between the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries and the European Community**: Article 32 concerns "Environment and Natural Resources" and states that ACP-EU cooperation will take into account 'the vulnerability of small island ACP countries, especially to the threat posed by climate change'(Official Journal of the European Communities, 2000).
- **2005, EC Strategy for Africa:** qualified climate change as a critical issue to address through its relations with African institutions and its support to Pan-African integration. This Strategy preluded the elaboration of a thematic partnership on climate change in the JAES (European Commission, 2005).
- **2006**, **Joint ACP-EU Declaration on Climate Change and Development**: this declaration emphasised the need to enhance dialogue in preparation of multilateral negotiations, including a commitment to consult regularly in the context of the UNFCCC meetings, and to enhance dialogue on mainstreaming climate change in development and poverty reduction strategies (ACP-EC, 2006).
- **2007**, **Joint Africa-EU Strategy**: the first joint Africa-EU strategy that clearly stated that *'Africa and the EU have a clear common interest to address [...] climate change'*. Partnership 6 on Climate Change (PCC) of the Strategy emphasised that addressing climate challenges is the basis for economic growth, job creation, social stability, adaptation and mitigation. It also stated that Africa and the EU should cooperate in global climate fora. Its main focus was climate adaptation and desertification (AU-EU, 2007).
- **2008**, **Joint EU-Africa Declaration on Climate Change**: this document was prepared ahead of the UNFCCC Conference (COP14) in Poznan in 2008. It includes references to principles of "equity" and "sustainable development". It also called for African governments and the EU to commit to fight climate change, based on the CBDR-principle (JAES, 2008). More specifically, it emphasised adaptation needs, opportunities for Africa to access market mechanisms, including REDD+, and related capacity building and climate finance requirements, in particular the need to improve the effectiveness of climate finance mechanisms, notably the AF and the (GEF (JAES, 2008).
- **2008**, **First Joint Africa-EU Action Plan** (2008-2010): this plan identified two priority actions of the PCC. The first priority refers to the creation of a common agenda on climate change. The second priority was to address land degradation and desertification (JAES, 2007).
- **2009**, **Joint ACP-EU Declaration on Climate Change and Development**: this updated declaration (first one in 2006) put forward the need to promote sustainable land management and biodiversity conservation in the international climate change regime.[102]
- **2009**, **Joint Roadmap for the Climate Change Partnership**: this document clarified the strategies for the implementation of the climate change declaration and action plan (2008-2010). It pointed out key components of the action plan, notably developing the capacities of African countries and regions in fighting climate change and it proposed specific activities to achieve the goals, mainly for capacity building. It also identified stakeholders and technical and financial means.[103]
- **2010**, **Joint Africa-EU Strategy, Action Plan 2011-2013**: the PCCE drew attention to the importance of "Green Economy", mitigation activities, funding for adaptation in Africa as well as fast-start finance. Since this action plan, P6 has covered climate change and biodiversity issues (JAES, 2010).
- **2014**, **EU-Africa Ministerial Statement on Climate Change**: this is the outcome document of a climate seminar, hosted by DG CLIMA's Commissioner, the President of AMCEN and the AU

[102] http://eu-un.europa.eu/articles/en/article_8763_en.htm.
[103] https://europafrica.files.wordpress.com/2009/07/draft-joint-roadmap.pdf.

Commissioner for Rural Economy and Agriculture (See Section 1), in the margin of the EU-Africa Summit (April 2014). It draws attention on the EU's and Africa's determination to adopt a legally binding UNFCCC agreement in 2015 and the urgent need to fund Africa's adaptation gap (European Commission, 2014b).

- **2014**, **EU-Africa Declaration**: in this document "climate change" is recognised as a threat to peace and security and it is stated that *'the EU will continue to support African countries in the preparation of national and regional climate-resilient and low-emission development strategies [...]'* (General Secretariat of the Council, 2014a).
- **2014, EU-Africa Roadmap (2014-2017)**: "climate change" falls under one of the five Priority Areas ("Global and Emerging Issues"), in contrast with the previous action plan (2011-2013) where one Partnership was entirely dedicated to "climate change" (General Secretariat of the Council, 2014b).

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ECDPM was established in 1986 as an independent foundation to improve European cooperation with the group of African, Caribbean and Pacific countries (ACP). Its main goal today is to broker effective partnerships between the European Union and the developing world, especially Africa. ECDPM promotes inclusive forms of development and cooperates with public and private sector organisations to better manage international relations. It also supports the reform of policies and institutions in both Europe and the developing world. One of ECDPM's key strengths is its extensive network of relations in developing countries, including emerging economies. Among its partners are multilateral institutions, international centres of excellence and a broad range of state and non-state organisations.

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